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HIDDEN TAXES
BRIAN GALLE•

ABSTRACT

The idea of hidden taxes is as old as John Stuart Mill, but convincing
evidence of their existence is new. In this Article, I survey and critique
recent studies that claim to show that there are some taxes that can go
unnoticed by those who pay them. I also develop the array of unanswered
theoretical questions and policy implications that potentially follow from
the studies' results.
Probably the central question for hidden taxes is whether they might
enable government to raise revenue without also distorting the economy. If
so, I argue, they have the potential to radically refashion the architecture
of redistributive government. But, as I also show, whether that is true
turns on the cognitive mechanisms that might permit taxes to go
unnoticed. For example, if hidden taxes are caused not by rational
ignorance but by cognitive shortcomings, then it is likely that the burden
of a hidden tax will be borne disproportionately by poorer taxpayers, and
vice-versa. Thus, I attempt to integrate with the tax literature some recent
developments in our understanding of bounded rationality in consumers
more generally.
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INTRODUCTION

There is a price to be paid for justice, if conventional economic
descriptions of taxation are true. In these accounts, fairness and welfare
compete: we can redistribute wealth from rich to poor, but only by making
society as a whole worse off. 1 Similarly, it is often said that local
governments should not, and typically cannot, redistribute wealth, because
those from whom wealth is taken will flee to less generous locales. 2 Both

I. ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975); Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1905, 1919-21 (1987); Walter J. Blwn & Hany Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case/or Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417,430 (1952); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System
Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 680-81
(1994).

2. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1631-38 (2000); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The
New Economics ofJurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86
GEO. L.J. 201, 212, 246 (1997); Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance to the Poor in a
Federal System, 32 J. PuB. ECON. 307, 328 (1987); Kirk J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax
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of these accounts depend on the assumption, long thought uncontroversial,
that taxes change people's behavior. 3 Yet, as this Article surveys, there is
startling new evidence that in some cases taxes do not change behavior at
all. Taxes can be "hidden," so that they collect revenue or redistribute
wealth without also affecting decisions about whether or where to earn or
spend. There are many uncertainties that attend this new field, as I also
discuss here. But, depending on what future research reveals, we may need
to revisit some basic assumptions of tax policy-as well as of public
finance economics-more generally.
The fairness-welfare tradeoff follows from the basic economic
assumption that in well-functioning markets the choices made by market
participants maximize each person's subjective welfare. 4 In order to fund
any government program, including one that furthers some redistributive
goal, society must raise revenue, usually through some form of tax. These
taxes change the price of the goods that are exchanged in the market,
altering consumers' decisions. In some instances, where markets are
themselves inefficient, taxes may deflect consumer choice closer to the
ideal point. But in the absence of externalities or other market failures, the
imposition of a tax that changes taxpayer behavior will reduce overall
societal welfare.
Thus, the ideal tax is the one that least affects the behavior of actors in
efficient markets. 5 Indeed, there is a tradition in public finance economics,
usually associated with Ramsey and Mirrlees, arguing that the most
efficient tax is one imposed on "inelastic" behavior-behavior that is
relatively insensitive to price. 6

Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 1389, 1408-10 (2004). But cf Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State
and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413, 478-80 (1996) (arguing that
some localities might have wealthy taxpayers with taste for redistribution).
3. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note I, at 1909.
4. For a more detailed explanation of these points, see infra Part I.
5. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY 8. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 279 (5th ed. 1989).
6. J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON.
STUD. 175, 175-208 (1971). For a handful of fine overviews, see Alan J. Auerbach, The Theory of
Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in I HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 61, 61-127 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985); Bankman & Griffith, supra note I, at 1945-58; Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics, in 2 HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1023-37 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987). To the extent
that this welfare-maximizing tax has undesirable distributive consequences-such as by imposing a
heavy tax on food, medicine, and other necessaries-its effects can perhaps be unwound with
government grants. Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Redistribution: Some Clarifications, 60 TAX L. REV.
57, 70-73 (2007). Additionally, a societal preference for certain distributions can be reflected in
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At the risk of making my argument here seem obvious, my claim in
this Article hinges on the observation that, in order for a tax to induce
behavioral changes from the taxpayer, the taxpayer must usually first be
aware of the tax. Similarly, if the size of the behavioral distortion is related
to the size of the tax bill, then a diminished awareness of the bill's
economic burdens should also diminish the distortion. It follows that an
unnoticed tax is, like a tax on highly inelastic behaviors, potentially more
efficient than more obvious excises.
These points are academic if taxpayers are perfectly rational and
possessed of full information about their own finances. However, a
growing literature, both in and outside the laboratory, suggests that, in
fact, taxpayers exhibit different responses to taxes that are more or less
"salient"-that is, noticeable or easy to process. 7 This is an old idea, but
evidence in support of it is new. 8 For example, Amy Finkelstein reports
that drivers are less sensitive to toll increases when tolls are debited
electronically rather than paid in cash. 9 Similarly, Chetty, Looney, and
Kroft find that shoppers are more responsive to sales taxes when those
taxes are posted on the shelf, rather than computed at the register. 10 In this
paper, I describe any of these tax designs, in which the behavioral effects
of the tax are less than predicted by classic economic theory, as a "hidden"
tax. 11

computation of the social welfare function, leading to a balancing between progressivity and
neutrality. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 1, at 1950-55.
7. My definition of "salient" taxes follows that in the existing literature. Edward J. McCaffery
& Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Neglect ofIndirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV.
DECISION MAKING 289, 289 (2006).
8. See Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in
TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUSSELL MATIHEWS 65, 65 (1988)
(tracing idea to early-20th century Italian economists); Isaac Martin & Nadav Gabay, Do Visible
Taxes Cause Protest? Tax Policy and Tax Protest in Rich Democracies 2, 5 (Sept. 7, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_
citation/1/8/2/8/9/pl82898_index.html) (describing history of"visibility hypothesis" as dating to John
Stuart Mill).
9. Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates 4 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=964887).
10. Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 1-2 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13330, 2007).
11. Thus, my usage of the term in this technical sense should be distinguished from earlier
mentions in the literature, which tend to use the phrase to refer either to the political salience of a tax
or more generally simply to describe costs that other commentators have not acknowledged. E.g.,
Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325,
332 (1995); George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard
Way": Negative Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 199 (2006); Edward
J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1874-86 (1994); Beverly Moran,
Income Tax Rhetoric (Or Why Do We Want Tax Reform?), 1992 WIS. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (1992);
Rebecca S. Rudnick, State and Local Taxes on Nonprofit Organizations, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 323
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My aim here is to explore the implications of hidden taxes for public
policy. It is possible that hidden taxes could revolutionize the design of
some government programs. For example, shifting to hidden taxes might
permit society to redistribute considerably more wealth to the poor while
holding the deadweight losses of tax constant, or, conversely, hold
redistribution constant while growing the economy. The relative salience
of taxes versus other forms of redistribution, such as regulation, should
inform our choice of redistributive instrument. And hidden taxes could
alter the conclusion of many pure tax policy questions, such as the choice
whether to stimulate the economy through rebate checks rather than
reduced payroll withholding, whether to redistribute income locally or
nationally, or the choice between sales tax and Value-Added Tax.
I argue, though, that all these outcomes depend on a number of
antecedent questions, many of which have not yet even been considered in
the literature. Perhaps most importantly, existing models of hidden tax
assume what might be termed a rational ignorance or "intentional" model
of tax salience. That is, the models assume that taxpayers neglect taxes as
a result of a calculated determination that the disutility of calculating tax
exceeds the present discounted value of avoiding the tax. 12 However, other
contributions to the behavioral economics literature imply that there are
alternative explanations, in which individuals are not capable of taking
into account the real future utility cost of present decisions. 13 I term these
other theories collectively the "unintentional ignorance" model. 14

(1993); Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation and the Tenth Amendment: On
Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 V AND. L. REV. 1355, 1336 (1993) (finding the
"unfunded mandate phenomenon ... understandable in public choice terms as a form of hidden
taxation imposed by poorly monitored, opportunistic legislators") (emphasis added). Prior usages that
appear similar to mine include Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us
Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 235 (1996); Nancy C. Staudt,
Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REv. 555, 589-90 (2002).
12. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 28-30. These models are part of a literature that, while
emphasizing the rational choice component of taxpayers' decisions, departs from classical economic
thought in positing that individuals' reasoning and deliberation are costly. Probably the definitive early
work is Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955); see also
Patrick Bolton & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem 1-3 (Nat'! Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. WI 1867, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=872723; see Brian E. Dollery & Andrew C. Worthington, The Empirical
Analysis of Fiscal f//usion, 10 J. ECON. SURVEYS 261, 264 (1996); Wallace E. Oates, "Automatic"
Increases in Tax Revenues-The Effect on the Size of the Public Budget, in FINANCING THE NEW
FEDERALISM: REVENUE SHARING CONDITIONAL GRANTS, AND TAXATION 143 (Wallace E. Oates ed.,
1975).
13. See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Economic
Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 138 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo
eds., 2003); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,
93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1449-70 (2003); Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence
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As I show here for the first time in the literature, the policy
implications of hidden taxes differ radically depending on whether the
intentional or unintentional model is more accurate. Under the intentional
model, taxes will not remain hidden when the tax bill becomes large,
because the benefits of avoiding the tax will eventually exceed the benefits
of avoiding having to think about tax. In that case, hidden taxes are
probably not a solution to the fairness-welfare tradeoff, because they
cannot raise enough revenue. In addition, depending on which model
ultimately prevails, hiding a tax may change who pays the tax. Hidden
taxes are likely progressive in a rational ignorance model, but regressive
otherwise.
Additional possible qualifications to the hidden tax story have been
recognized by other scholars, but not explored in any great depth. 15 Thus,
another contribution of this Article is to examine in close focus the
possibility that taxpayers might anticipate hidden taxes or that learning
and experience might over time increase the salience of the hidden tax. In
addition, I want to highlight the fiscal federalism aspects of the problem,
which thus far also have not been addressed by the literature. Changes in
the salience of a tax may affect Tiebout sorting-that is, the choice of
which bundle of local taxes and government services we wish to
consume. 16 That possibility implies that hidden taxes might best be
employed, if anywhere, at the national level.
Finally, I point out that the new findings that hidden taxes change
consumer behavior distinguish these developments from what has come
before. The long-standing view of hidden taxes focused solely on their
political implications, in particular the possibility that low salience may
also present opportunities for self-serving tax increases by public officials,

from the Field 1-52 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13420, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= IO 14797.
14. I choose the term "unintentional ignorance" rather than "irrational" because only some of
these alternatives depend on individuals who are actually irrational; others depend on lack of full
information. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58. All of them, however, have in common the
assumption that when a person fails to take account of tax, he or she has not made an explicit choice to
ignore the tax.
15. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 36-47; Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 35-36; Amy Finkelstein,
E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates 4-6 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12924,
2007) [hereinafter Finkelstein, Working Paper].
16. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416-24
(1956); see Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1122-23 (1999).
For a survey of contemporary extrapolations and responses, see Dennis Epple & Thomas Nechyba,
Fiscal Decentralization, in HANDBOOK OF URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS 2423, 2423-80 (J.
Vernon Henderson & Jacques-Francois eds., 2004).
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leading to inefficiently high tax rates. 17 However, as I review here, there
has never been any convincing empirical evidence that low salience results
in higher taxes. I argue that, in fact, that view rests on several faulty
assumptions. For instance, in a world where some voters know that taxes
are hidden from others, the usual incentive to free-ride on lobbying efforts
of others unravels, so that hidden taxes may actually lead to more anti-tax
lobbying and lower taxes.
In short, the fact that some taxes may be less salient than others can be
more than a happy accident; it may well be a feature of the tax system we
should intentionally seek to develop, just as with other proposals for the
optimally efficient tax. However, before we go down that road, with its
troubling implications for democratic theory, it might be wise to first
consider some possible limits on the efficiency-enhancing potential of
hidden taxes.
Part I of this Article offers readers new to the tax literature a short
overview of the economics of taxation. Part II explains hidden taxes: their
potential forms, existing evidence that they may affect behavior, the
welfare implications of these findings, and the uncertain cognitive science
behind what we have observed. Part III considers two possible objections
to the claim that hidden taxes might increase social welfare: taxpayers may
anticipate hidden taxes, or learn to recognize them. Similarly, Part IV
analyzes the potential welfare losses from hidden taxes, such as from
inefficiently large government, or from redistribution from poor to rich.
Part V previews some of the policy implications that would result if
hidden taxes genuinely could increase welfare, including the chance that
we might face a conflict between open and democratic government and
greater social welfare.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF THE FAIRNESS/EFFICIENCY DILEMMA

This Part sketches the economic underpinnings of the progressive tax
dilemma. Readers already familiar with the economics of taxation may
safely skip to the last paragraph.
Before beginning my analysis of hidden taxes, let me take a step back
for a moment and first explain why fairness is said to be costly. Start with
the basics of supply and demand. In a well-functioning market, social

17. GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 24-32, 40 (1980); Susanne Lohmann & Deborah M.
Weiss, Hidden Taxes and Representative Goveniment: The Political Economy of the Ramsey Rule, 30
PUB. FIN. REV. 579, 579-611 (2002).
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.welfare is maximized when goods are exchanged at the so-called
equilibrium price, the point at which the marginal consumer's willingness
to pay for the good is exactly equal to the marginal cost of producing the
next unit of it. 18 Every unit sold before that point is sold at profit, and also
feels like a "bargain" for the consumer, who (assuming the typical
downward-sloping demand curve) was willing to pay more than the
equilibrium price. 19 Thus, nearly every exchange increases society's total
utility.2°
·
·
Taxes ruin this happy story by increasing the effective price of taxed
goods. 21 Because the taxed item now costs more, fewer people want it,
meaning that there are fewer utility-enhancing exchanges. 22 Furthermore,
since there is only a tax when the good is actually exchanged, this
diminution is a pure "deadweight loss"; it reduces welfare, without taking
in any revenues for use by the government. 23 Alternatively, consumers
may still buy goods similar to those taxed, but they will shift to an item
that is less preferred but cheaper after tax, which also diminishes their
satisfaction. 24 Figure 1 illustrates these principles. 25

18. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 280.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; Auerbach, supra note 6, at 68.
22. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 280.
23. Id. at 284. To be clear, the deadweight loss or "excess burden" of the tax is the change in
total social welfare resulting from the substitution effect of the tax. The assumption here is that we can
hold income constant; taxes are exchanged for government services on a one-for-one basis. Thus, a tax
that only collected revenue and did not change any behavior would not create an excess burden. Id. at
289. This baseline for comparison is often called the "lump sum" tax, on the assumption that an
undifferentiated tax on every individual would be the least distortive of any possible design. Id. at 287.
24. It is possible that these distortions might actually increase welfare in a market that was
already imperfect. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 294; Stiglitz, supra note 6, at 1023.
25. See infra p. 67.
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We thus come to the conflict between distributive fairness and overall
welfare. Suppose (as I assume for the sake of argument here) that our
system of distributive justice requires us to redistribute at least some
money from richer to poorer. 26 Every dollar raised through the tax system
to carry out this redistribution also creates a deadweight loss. The greater
the amount of redistribution a society carries out, the less well off it is. 27
On the other hand, there is a diminishing marginal utility of wealth-a
dollar is worth more to those who have fewer of them. 28 The implication is
that moving money from richer to poorer can increase overall utility. 29 So,

26.
JOHN E.
27.
28.
29.

For a wide-ranging overview of different approaches to the imperative for redistribution, see
ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE { 1996).
MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 83.
Id. at 78-79.

Id.
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taking this factor into account, there is at best a welfare tradeoff inherent
in any redistribution. 30
The welfare/fairness tradeoff is especially acute in the design of an
income tax. 31 A progressive tax, for example, is one in which more of the
burden of taxation is borne by wealthier taxpayers. 32 Progressive taxes are
inherently redistributive: even if revenues are spent equally on all citizens,
progressive taxation ensures that the richest pay more than the per capita
value of the spending, while the poorest pay less. 33 The progressive
component of a tax system can be greatly enhanced by the use of a
progressive rate structure-that is, a structure in which the tax rate also
rises with income. 34 However, the substitution effect of a tax rises with the
tax rate. 35 Thus, unless the substitution effect distortion is counteracted by
an income effect, progressive taxes lead to larger deadweight losses. 36
There is evidence that, at least at very high tax rates, income taxes
encourage taxpayers to shift from the taxed good, labor, to the untaxed
substitutes: leisure and "off-the-books" labor. 37
Economists and tax lawyers have proposed to resolve this taxing
problem by attempting to impose taxes on decisions that are very unlikely

30. MATII TuOMALA, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX AND REDISTRIBUTION 3 (1990). It is worth
emphasizing that this account leaves aside any additional welfare gains society might realize from
achieving its preference for the ideal distribution of goods, over and above gains from the diminishing
marginal utility of wealth. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 990-93 (2001).
31. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note I, at 1945.
32. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 523 (2d ed. 2007).
33. For instance, suppose three citizens, Al, Betty, and Cash. Al earns $100, Betty $1000, and
Cash $10,000. There is a 10% tax rate. Obviously, total revenues are ($10 + $100 + $1000) = $1110. If
spending is equal, the government spends $370 on each. So Cash has transferred $630 to Al and Betty,
with Betty receiving $270 and Al receiving $360.
34. To return to Al, Betty, and Cash, assume now a progressive rate structure in which Al pays
I% tax, Betty 5%, and Cash I 0%. Revenues now are ($1 + $50 + $1000) = $1051, and per capita
spending roughly $350. Cash has transferred $650, compared to $630 under a flat tax.
35. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 290. To reiterate, a "substitution effect" is the
change in behavior caused by the change in price of one good relative to other options. It should be
contrasted with the "income effect," which is a change in behavior resulting from alterations in an
individual's wealth.
36. Although income and substitution effects are not always at cross-currents, they do seem to
work in opposite directions in the case of the income tax: taxing labor encourages a substitution
towards leisure, while lower income increases the utility value of an additional hour of labor.
37. Bankman & Griffith, supra note I, at 1921-23; Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez, The Elasticity
of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications, 84 J. PUB. ECON. I, 1-32 (2002); Mark H. Showalter
& Norman K. Thurston, Taxes and Labor Supply of High-Income Physicians, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 73,
90-91 (1997) (finding that the response by self-employed physicians to higher marginal tax rates
suggests that the zero elasticity of federal revenue with respect to the top end marginal tax rate is in
part due to changes in the labor supply).
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to change. 38 In slightly more technical language, the prescription is to tax
inelastic behavior more heavily. That is the classic account set out by
Ramsey, Mirrlees, and others. 39
Again, though, the typical tax on inelastic behavior does not escape the
conflict with distributive justice. For one thing, most inelastic taxes are
regressive-that is, they fall disproportionately on poorer taxpayers. 40
Inelastically demanded goods, such as food and prescription drugs, are
usually just the things that occupy most of an indigent taxpayer's budget. 41
Other nondistortive taxes, such as a uniform "head tax" on every
individual, would raise only a small fraction of the revenue needed for
social insurance programs for the indigent. 42
Thus, as Mirrlees argued, the "optimal" tax would balance efficiency
against the need for redistribution. 43 That is, the ideal tax rate would be
one that maximizes the tradeoff between the welfare gains from satisfying
society's preference for distributive fairness and the deadweight loss of
progressive tax rates. 44 In the income tax context, this has included
proposals ranging from a mildly progressive rate structure to an outright
regressive tax rate, although in the second case the tax would be combined
with a flat grant to every citizen to render the system progressive overall. 45
Mirrlees's solution, although in many ways elegant, has hardly ended
debate over progressive taxation. Many commentators continue to
advocate for completely flat rates, or even head taxes, pointing again to the
distortive effects of taxation on the economy. 46 From the other direction,
proponents of more progressive taxation could perhaps argue that optimal

38. MUSGRAVE &MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 292-93.
39. See sources cited supra note 6.
40. GRUBER, supra note 32, at 523.
41. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1680-82 (2005); Chetty et al.,
supra note 10, at 50.
42. SeeAvi-Yonah,supranote2,at 1631-38.
43. Mirrlees, supra note 6, at 175.
44. Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the
Income Tax, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 135, 137 (1996).
45. TuOMALA, supra note 30, at 8-9, 12-14; Kaplow, supra note 44, at 138. The regressive tax
plus flat grant is progressive overall because the flat grant amount is more valuable to lower-income
taxpayers.
46. E.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (Hoover Inst. Press 2d ed.
1995); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical
Bases/or Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221, 269-71 (1995); ROBERT E.
HALL ET AL., AMERICAN ENTER. INST., FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX (1996),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021130_70450.pdf; Daniel J. Mitchell, Commentary, Russia's Flat-Tax
Miracle, The Heritage Foundation, Mar. 24, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/
ed032403.cfm;.
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tax theory is unrealistic to the extent that it depends on flat grants to
achieve progressivity. Spending can iron out tax inequalities, but where
spending decisions are politically separate from tax determinations, there
is arguably a danger that an unfair tax system will simply produce unfair
results. But if one is dealing in theoretical ideals, this critiqu~ is less than
trenchant.
Hidden taxes, in contrast, present a potential challenge both to optimal
tax theory as well as to opponents of progressive taxation more generally.
If progressive taxes can be imposed in a way that minimizes behavioral
responses, and therefore deadweight losses, then the optimal degree of
progressivity might shift significantly towards higher rates on wealthier
taxpayers. I explore the plausibility of that outcome in the Parts that
follow.
II. BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF HIDDEN TAXES

This Part introduces the concept of hidden taxes and their potential role
in tax economics. After briefly sketching in Part II.A. some possible forms
that hidden taxes may take, I then survey in Part 11.B. the evidence that
some taxes are less salient than others. Part II.C. explores the welfare
implications of these findings. Part II.D. then argues that the current
literature has not yet offered a convincing account of what mental
processes are responsible for diminished consumer response to tax,
leaving some major holes in the story suggested by Part II.C.

A. Forms ofHidden Taxation
In order to help the reader develop intuitions for the remammg
discussion, it may be useful to survey some of the forms a hidden tax
might take on. Marketers and advertisers have spent decades developing
techniques for reducing the price consumers perceive for commercial
products. 47 In an important paper, Krishna and Slemrod predict that many

47. Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 409-11 (2004);
Vicki G. Morwitz et al., The Price Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges: A
Review of Research on Partitioned Pricing 6-10 (Feb. 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=l350004); see Aradhna Krishna et al., A MetaAnalysis of the Impact of Price Presentation on Perceived Savings, 78 J. RETAILING JOI, 101-18
(2002). Salience also affects consumer responses to non-price product qualities. E.g., Kristin Kiesel &
Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Another Nutritional Label-Experimenting with Grocery Store Shelf Labels and
Consumer Choice 16-17 (CUDARE, Working Paper 1060, 2008), available at http://ideas.repec.org/
p/cdl/agrebk/ I 060.html.
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of these techniques can also lower the perceived cost oftaxation. 48
Among the most important of these "price presentation" tactics is the
49
splitting of a purchase price into a series of small future payments.
Consumers may perceive the sum of a series of small payments as
considerably less than its actual present value.so This idea has a number of
ready applications to tax. Sales taxes, for example, are a form of public
financing that divides a taxpayer's contribution into many tiny pieces.
Classic fiscal federalism theory predicts that citizens will choose where to
live based on the basket of public goods received in exchange for total
taxes paid.st By dividing the total tax "price" for its basket of public goods
into many small transactions, a jurisdiction can make itself appear to be a
better bargain than its competitors.s 2 Similarly, the marginal propensity of
an individual to work depends on the rate of tax imposed on that labor,
since salary minus tax determines the opportunity cost of enjoying time off
instead.s 3 If, instead of a single stated tax, the worker confronts a series of
small tax payments-for instance, if there is income-tax withholding-she
may underestimate the tax she pays and work "too much" relative to her
underlying preference for work vs. leisure.s4
Prices are also difficult for consumers to identify where costs depend in
part on future events. Consumers typically have imperfect information
about how often these future events will occur, and may systematically
underestimate total cost as a result.ss For instance, a number of credit card

48. Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price
Presentation, 10 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 189, 189 (2003).
49. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 193-94. On the effect of splitting two simultaneous
components of price, see John M. Clark & Sidne G. Ward, Consumer Behavior in Online Auctions: An
Examination of Partitioned Prices on eBay, 16 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 57, 57--66 (2008);
Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, ... Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in
Field Experiments on eBay, 6 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y I, 1-4 (2006); Vicki G. Moiwitz
et al., Divide and Prosper: Consumers' Reactions to Partitioned Prices, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 453,
453-63 (1998).
50. Jerry A. Hausman, Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of EnergyUsing Durables, 10 BELL J. ECON. 33, 33-34 (1979); see Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 11,
at 196.
51. Oates, supra note 16, at 1122-23.
52. See Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 264; cf Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at
192 (projecting that governments will prefer to use sales taxes).
53. See sources cited supra note 37. On the other hand, as Joe Bankman suggested during a
presentation of this paper, if people choose their career or their residence on the basis of a rough
estimate of the lifestyle the job or venue provides, perceived tax rates are unlikely to affect those kinds
of choices.
54. ANDREA LoUISE CAMPBELL, How AMERICANS THINK ABOUT TAXES: PUBLIC OPINION AND
THE AMERICAN FISCAL STATE (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 25-26, on file with author).
55. See Oren Bar-Gill, Informing Consumers About Themselves 2, 14 (N.Y. Univ. Law and Econ.
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-44, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
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contracts permit the issuer to charge late and default fees. 56 In recent
studies, many consumers appear wrongly to have assumed that they will
not incur such fees, and as a result have selected cards whose expected
cost, including fees, is higher than the optimal choice. 57
Taxes, too, may appear to be lower at the time of a relevant decision
than their true future cost because of taxpayer misestimates of future
events. A citizen may vote to approve a carbon tax on the assumption that
she will bike to work and insulate her home, but later lack the willpower to
give up her car, or lack the cash (as a result of other consumption
decisions) to hire a carpenter. Individuals or businesses may relocate to a
jurisdiction with user fees expecting to be able to avoid those fees, but
then find that they are unable to do so. Others may plan to submit claims
for optional refunds, as in the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit or the
European VAT system, but never do so. 58
These scenarios are all plausible extrapolations from existing consumer
studies. It is worth emphasizing that no studies have yet confirmed that
these precise forms of cognitively challenging taxes in fact change
taxpayer behavior. But these fact patterns are suggestive of the many ways
in which hidden taxes might be deployed.

B. Evidence on Tax Salience
While there are no studies directly confirming the price presentation
theory, there is now a substantial literature suggesting that individuals are
less than fully aware of the extent of their fiscal obligations to the state. A
number of early studies, likely sparked by the Nobel-winning economist
James Buchanan, simply posited the hypothesis that less-salient tax
systems permit higher levels of taxation. 59 The researchers then attempted

1056381.
56. Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 29.
57. Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults. Credit Card Profits. and Bankruptcy, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 249,263 (1997); Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card
Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 75-76 (1991); Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract
Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q. J. ECON. 353, 377-79 (2004); David B. Gross
& Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior?
Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q. J. ECON. 149, 171 (2002); Sha Yang et al., Unrealistic
Optimism in Consumer Credit Card Adoption, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL., 170, 181 (2007).
58. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 194. For evidence on the low rate of rebate claims,
see Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing, and Behavioral Economics of Consumer Rebates, 12
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 362, 368--69 (2007) (collecting sources); Tim Silk & Chris Janiszewski,
Managing Mail-in Rebate Promotions 5 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.cba.ufl.edu/
rnkt/docs/janiszewski/Rebate.pdf).
59. James M. Buchanan, The fiscal illusion, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS:
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to measure relationships between putatively less-visible taxes and the size
of government. 60 These studies were inconclusive. 61 It therefore is unclear
from the size-of-government studies whether voters respond differently to
low-salience taxes. For example, it is possible that voters do react
differently to a less-noticeable tax, but political officials are still unable or
unwilling to raise taxes in response.
McCaffery and Baron advanced the debate through a series of
laboratory simulations of tax setting. 62 Test subjects were willing to
tolerate higher overall tax levels when the tax was imposed through many
smaller taxes, rather than through a single large tax. 63 McCaffery and
Baron dubbed this phenomenon the "disaggregation bias"; subjects
appeared unable to hold together in their minds the cumulative effects of
several separate, overlapping tax regimes. 64 And subjects seemed to resist
income taxes more than payroll or business taxes, which McCaffery and
Baron thought were more hidden. 65
Other recent laboratory studies are similar. Sausgruber and Tyran
report that their subjects were willing to accept higher taxes when the tax
was nominally imposed on sellers rather than buyers, even though the
ultimate economic burden of the tax did not change. 66 And Blumkin et al.
find that lab subjects who were paid a small reward worked harder when
the tax on the reward was presented as a sales rather than income tax. 67

FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 135, 135 ( 1967).
60. Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 293-94.
61. Oates, supra note 8, at 66; Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 293-94.
62. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 7, at 289; Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking
About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 106 (2006); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The
Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter McCaffery &
Baron, Political Psychology]; Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues:
Disaggregation Bias in the Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 230 (2003).
63. McCaffery & Baron, Political Psychology, supra note 62, at 1765-68, 1773-80.
64. Although McCaffery and Baron term this a "bias," one could argue that the preference the
subjects were expressing was rational. After all, deadweight losses typically are increasing in
proportion to the amount of tax on any given base. We can therefore minimize distortions by spreading
the incidence of taxation widely. Subjects might thus have been opting for a less distortive tax regime.
However, there is little indication that these considerations were motivating the subjects. For example,
many shifted their preferences towards the lower, unitary tax after counseling.
65. McCaffery & Baron, Political Psychology, supra note 62, at 1761-64.
66. Ruper Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation 2 (Univ. of
Copenhagen Dept. of Econ., Working Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1292731.
67. Tomer Blumkin et al., Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent?
Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods 4-14 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies, IFO Inst. for
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2194, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id= I 079784.
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These results dovetail with real-world studies of bounded voter
rationality, which is said to result in a "fiscal illusion": voters misperceive
taxing and spending systems. 68 For instance, the "flypaper effect"
literature reports numerous instances in which local government entities
received grants but failed to reduce their own revenue efforts in response
to the infusion of outside cash. 69 That result is contrary to what we should
likely expect of fully rational actors in the absence of matching grants. 70
Although the flypaper literature is still evolving, one powerful explanation
consistent with much of the data is that local voters are unaware of the
new, improved fiscal condition of their government, or misconceive the
relationship between the grant and the opportunity to reduce their own tax
expenditures. 71 Similarly, some unpublished studies report that individual
taxpayers behave in unexpected ways in response to the federal tax

68. Oates, supra note 8, at 65.
69. Katherine Baicker, Government Decision-Making and the Incidence ofFederal Mandates, 82
J. PUB. ECON. 147, 177-78 (2001); Rebecca J. Campbell, Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion in Local
Government Overlapping Jurisdictions, 120 PUB. CHOICE 301, 324 (2004); Radu Filimon et al.,
Asymmetric Information and Agenda Control: The Bases of Monopoly Power in Public Spending, 17 J.
PUB. ECON. 51, 60-61 (1982); Nora Gordon, Do Federal Grants Boost School Spending? Evidence
from Title I, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1771, 1773 (2004); Peter M. Mitias & Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Grant
Illusion, Tax Illusion, and Local Government Spending, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 347, 361 (2001); Geoffrey
K. Turnbull, The Overspending and Flypaper Effects of Fiscal Illusion: Theory and Empirical
Evidence, 44 J. URB. ECON. 1, 15-232 (1998); Byron F. Lutz, Taxation with Representation:
Intergovernmental Grants in a Plebiscite Democracy 24 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working
Paper No. 2006-06, 2006), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/FEDS/2006/200606/
200606pap.pdf. But see Brian Knight, Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State
Government Spending: Theory and Evidence.from the Federal Highway Aid Program, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 71, 88 (2002) ("[F]ederal highway grants crowd out state highway spending, leading to little or
no increase in net spending.").
70. David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, The Analysis ofRevenue Sharing in a New Approach
to Collective Fiscal Decisions, 85 Q.J. ECON. 416, 420--23, 434 (1971) (explaining how a lump sum
distributed to a group may have diffuse economic benefit to all individuals through revenue sharing);
David F. Bradford & Wallace E. Oates, Towards a Predictive Theory of Intergovernmental Grants, 61
AM. ECON. REV. 440, 443 (1971) (suggesting that given certain conditions, a system that gave grants
to individuals could "lead[] via the political process to precisely the same equilibrium state of the
community as does the grant to the collectivity"); Ronald C. Fisher, Income and Grant Effects on
Local Expenditure: The Flypaper Effect and Other Difficulties, 12 J. URB. ECON. 324, 325-26 (1982).
That is, the grant shifts the state's demand curve for government services outward without changing its
shape. For example, if I want my government to spend $100 on roads, I will vote in favor of$ I 00 in
road spending, regardless of whether someone else gives me another $50. Thus, when my government
receives the $50 grant, I will expect it to spend $100 on roads and cut my taxes by $50. Or, I may be
willing to spend slightly more than $100, as a result of the additional wealth represented by the grant.
Fisher, supra, at 328. But that will simply shift my demand curve for all normal goods, including
roads, outwards slightly. This analysis does not work perfectly for matching grants, which for
obvious reasons tend to encourage the state to spend more than it would otherwise prefer on the
matched expenditure. ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 116--19 (2000).
71. For a more thorough discussion of the fiscal illusion explanation for observed flypaper data,
see Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. 875, 926--30 (2008).

2009]

HIDDEN TAXES

75

system, most likely because they do not understand the concept of
marginal tax rates. 72
Finally, a set of quite recent results provides stronger evidence yet that
taxpayers not only vote differently in response to hidden taxes, but also
change their consumption decisions. In one of these studies, purchasers
were more sensitive to after-tax prices when the amount of the sales tax
was posted. 73 Surveys of the shoppers studied found that the shoppers
knew to a fairly high degree of precision the amount of sales tax in their
jurisdiction at the time they entered the store. 74 A possible implication is
that in the absence of a posted notice of the sales tax, consumers make
consumption decisions before they get to the register, without computing
the likely sales tax, and do not change their minds once they see the taxinclusive bill. 75 This may suggest that, because the unposted sales tax has a
relatively low salience, it has lower behavioral effects than the exact same
tax when the tax rate is posted. As Chetty et al. argue, consumers may
engage in a kind of cognitive loafing: they know of the tax but simply
don't bother to compute the tax-inclusive price of an individual item,
perhaps because the utility of avoiding that calculation is higher than the
value of the savings. 76
Another economist, Amy Finkelstein, has made similar findings. In her
study, she observed that where tolls were collected electronically, and
therefore somewhat beneath the notice of the toll payers, the demand for
driving on toll roads was less elastic. 77 That is, drivers were less sensitive
to toll increases than they had been at the same facility before the
electronic toll collection and less sensitive than other contemporaneous

72. Naomi Feldman & Peter Katu~cak, Should rhe Average Tax Rate be Marginalized? (Ctr. For
Econ. Research & Graduate Educ., Working Paper No. 304, 2006); Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Schmeduling (Oct. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.hks.harvard.
edu/jeflreyliebman/schmeduling.pdf); cf Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 196-97 (describing
phenomenon whereby consumers erroneously evaluate savings based on percentages rather than
absolute dollar amounts).
73. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 10-18.
74. Id. at 26-28.
75. This result is subject to two interpretations, only one of which supports my thesis here. One
conclusion, as I suggest in the body text, is that the increased salience of the sales tax increases the
consumer's response to the tax. An alternative conclusion is that consumers are tax-averse; that is, they
are less willing to pay a given price knowing that some portion of it is a "tax" rather than simply a
"price." That may not be irrational. For example, the fact that some of the cost of a good is known to
be tax might indicate that the good could be purchased more cheaply in a jurisdiction with a lower tax,
and the consumer prefers to postpone purchase until she finds the low-tax opportunity. Again, though,
the consumers knew the sales tax rate before shopping. This implies that the consumers were willing to
shop in a jurisdiction where their purchases would be subject to tax.
76. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 28-35.
77. Finkelstein, Working Paper, supra note 15, at 2.
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drivers at facilities without electronic collection. 78 In this case, survey data
suggested that drivers who used electronic payment not only did not know
their total periodic toll costs; they also did not know the toll rate. 79
Gallagher and Muehlegger also claim to have observed a salience
effect in their study of tax incentives for fuel-efficient cars, but there are a
number of potential questions with their results. 80 According to Gallagher
and Muehlegger, consumers were much more responsive to sales tax
incentives to buy hybrid cars than they were to income tax breaks for the
same purpose. Since sales tax benefits are immediate, while income tax
benefits do not accrue until the following year when the purchaser files her
income tax return, we should expect some preference for sales taxes. But
Gallagher and Muehlegger also found that the effect of the income tax
incentive was largest in the second quarter of the year, around tax filing
season, whereas on a pure time-value-of-money calculation the best time
to buy would be in December. 81 They argue that this timing result suggests
that the greater salience of the income tax around filing season improves
the efficacy of the income tax incentive, even though a purchase in April
will not be deductible until the following year.
There are a number of factors that Gallagher and Muehlegger do not
appear to control for that could confound their salience result. 82 For one,
the greater efficacy of the more immediate sales-tax discount could be
caused by a higher than average time-discounting rate among some
consumers. Next, if we should expect a spike in an income tax incentive's
efficacy around filing season, there should also be a spike in the fourth
quarter caused by taxpayers who obtained six-month extensions. Gallagher
and Muehlegger report instead that the effect of the incentive declined
"monotonically with each successive quarter" after the first. 83 Unobserved
characteristics of buyers could also be driving their result. The study did
not observe advertising by dealers, which may have been more intensive

78. Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 18-30.
79. Id. at 14-16.
80. Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green to Get Green: Incentives and
Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology 22-24, 28 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov't,
Working Paper No. RWP08-009, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?
abstract id=l083716.
81. - Id. at 23-24. December is ideal because it is closest to the end of the tax year. The best time
to buy would be the day before filing taxes, since that would minimize the time cost of waiting for the
deduction. But of course income taxes are usually calculated annually, so for taxpayers on a calendaryear tax year, December is the closest one can come to the buy-today, file-tomorrow optimum.
82. To be fair, the public version of the Gallagher and Muehlegger draft is still at the working
paper stage.
83. Gallagher & Muehlegger, supra note 80, at 24.
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during "tax season" in areas offering income tax incentives. Finally,
perhaps the second quarter is a time when purchasers who are especially
price-sensitive are disproportionately in the market: students, those
anticipating extensive summer travel (with accompanying trips to the
pump), or model-year-end bargain hunters. 84 Since those individuals
would have more elastic demand, they would make it look as though the
tax incentive were more effective. 85 Thus, although this latest study is
suggestive, it is not yet a significant advance over Chetty et al. and
Finkelstein.
Notwithstanding some doubts about "green" incentives, the evidence
so far seems to be generally in line with the intuition I laid out at the
outset. Where individuals do not fully perceive the burden of a tax, or
where not all individuals perceive it, the total behavioral changes m
response to the tax, whether in voting or consumption, are smaller.

C. Hidden Taxes and Welfare
Both the Chetty et al. and Finkelstein papers suggest a provocative
conclusion that may follow from their data: hidden taxes may be more
efficient than others. 86 The basic premise is deceptively simple. As I
explained in Part I, taxes that change behavior of rational actors in
efficient markets reduce overall welfare, because by definition the
undistorted choices of self-maximizing actors represent their best possible
subjective outcome. 87 In the case of hidden taxes, however, there is a
smaller behavioral response than in a perfectly visible tax. 88 Thus, the

84. Gallagher and Muehlegger do control for quarter fixed-effects, which might soak up some of
these variations. Gallagher and Muehlegger, supra note 80, at 27.
85. Although this elasticity-of-demand story would also likely be true of sales taxes, it is unclear
from the public version of Gallagher and Muehlegger whether sales tax effectiveness varies by quarter.
In e-mail with this author, Prof. Muehlegger reports that the study did not observe any changes in sales
tax effectiveness.
86. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 36-51; Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 4.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
88. Blumkin et al., supra note 67, at 16. It might be argued that the significance of this point is
much diminished to the extent that all potential substitutes for the good are subject to tax. That is, if
the consumer will pay a comparable amount of tax no matter what she decides, then there is no
substitution effect (although there is still an income effect). (I am grateful to Joe Dodge and Steve
Sal op for this point.)
In practice, though, this situation almost never arises. For example, even if all goods are subject to
sales tax, a consumer can save instead, or purchase on the black market. Cf Kaplow, supra note 44, at
146 (noting estimates of$100 billion U.S. tax revenue lost to blackmarket transactions). Both of these
alternatives become less attractive if taxes are hidden. Likewise, even if all labor earnings are taxed
similarly, a consumer can substitute leisure for work.
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distortion away from the social optimum point is smaller. 89 This is
illustrated by figure 2.
FIGURE2
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Indeed, the welfare gains from reduced distortions increase
dramatically as the amount of distortion diminishes. That is because the
deadweight loss from tax (or, conversely, the welfare gains from
eliminating deadweight loss) increase in proportion to the square of the

89. Chetty et al., supra note JO, at 38--40. This description assumes a market that would be
efficient if not for tax. In the case of distortions that might be offset by tax, such as Pigouvian taxes on
externalities, a diminished behavioral effect would actually reduce welfare. Thus, cigarette taxes,
carbon taxes and the like should be designed to be as visible as possible. See Finkelstein, supra note 9,
at 12-13.
Also, readers attentive to technical detail should be aware that for expositional purposes my
description here assumes that compensated and uncompensated demand coincide. Chetty et al. also
discuss situations where that is not the case, as I will address shortly.
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size of the distortion. 9° Figure 2 also illustrates this point. Notice that the
area of deadweight loss is a triangle with legs comprised of the shift along
the supply and demand curves. 91 Thus, since the area of a right triangle is
one-half the product of its two legs, and the two legs here are of the same
length, the area of deadweight loss increases with the square of the
distance that the tax shifts the supply curve.
One important complication, as both studies acknowledge, is that
hidden taxes may not necessarily increase welfare for consumers. 92 In
essence, the hidden tax causes the consumer to buy an item she would not
otherwise have purchased at that price, so that she experiences a loss to the
extent she overpays. However, since the amount of the overpayment is
exactly equal to the amount of additional tax collected, society as a whole
comes out even. 93 At least, society comes out even if taxes are not wasted,
and recipients of spending on average are no wealthier than the misled
customers.
Another wrinkle in this story arises where there are distortions not only
from the substitution effect but also from income effects. 94 That is, at
times the mere fact that a taxpayer has less money will change what she
buys or the amount of work she does. For instance, if the consumer
doesn't realize her bank account is low, she may find at the end of the
month she doesn't have enough cash for the things she planned to buy.
Chetty et al. attempt to minimize this problem by arguing that the
consumer's welfare losses may be small, depending on how she orders her
purchase decisions. 95 That is, the reason the consumer loses welfare when
she overpays is because she has lost an opportunity to buy other goods
with her available funds. The size of that second-order welfare loss
depends on which goods are crowded out by the hidden tax. If the

90. Auerbach, supra note 6, at 74.
91. The figure depicts the deadweight loss triangles caused by a first distortion, from point A to
point C, and a second, smaller distortion resulting when the equilibrium point is shifted back to point
B.
92. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 41-47; Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 10. Blumkin et al. argue
that a laborer's utility can be unchanged even under a totally opaque consumption tax, because
consumption remains constant in the shift from income to consumption taxation. Blumkin et al., supra
note 67, at 16-18. But to obtain that result, the worker has to work more, giving up leisure. That
should reduce the worker's welfare. As best this author can discern, Blumkin et al. appear not to
include a term for welfare losses from foregone leisure in their proof.
93. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 38.
94. Id. at 42-43.
95. Id. at 41-46; see also B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference:
Choice Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics 23-24 (Nat') Bureau of Econ.
available
at
http://papers.ssm.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
13737,
2008),
com/sol3/papers.cfrn?abstract_id=I086986 (modeling generalized version of the Chetty et al. theory).
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consumer gives up only the least-preferred item she would otherwise have
bought, her loss is much smaller than if she gives up the first. In other
words, if paying too much because of hidden taxes leaves us without
money for a pack of gum or a fifth DVD per month from Netflix, we're
not so bad off, but if it leaves us at the end of the month just short of
making rent, the tax hurts us pretty badly. Thus, Chetty et al. argue that the
amount of welfare loss for consumers will depend on their ability to
recognize that they are paying hidden taxes and to order their purchases
accordingly. 96 Whether or not this is a plausible possibility is a subject I
will return to shortly.
Irrespective of consumer losses, hidden taxes may still on net increase
welfare because they also create both producer surplus and government
revenues. That is, under a hidden tax producers make additional, profitable
sales beyond those that they would have made at the perfectly transparent
post-tax equilibrium. 97 And there will be more transactions subject to tax,
the proceeds of which can be used for welfare-enhancing projects,
transfers to the poor, and so on. This is not the venue for detailed
mathematical proofs, but in general we should expect these two effects to
often be larger than the consumer's welfare loss, assuming that consumers
and producers are of comparable wealth. 98 That result is magnified if
Chetty et al. are correct in claiming that consumer welfare losses are only
second-order. 99

96. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 42-44. For a summary of studies of consumer capacity to
allocate their budgets across purchases, see Daniel Read et al., Choice Bracketing, 19 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 171, 185 (1999). In general, "[m]oney saved in one category will be recycled into that
category." Id. This supports the Chetty et al. story: expenditures in, say, grooming products are
unlikely to affect choices of health care or food.
97. Technically, whether these additional sales are profitable will depend on the extent to which
the producer bears the incidence of the tax or instead is able to shift the cost of the tax to consumers. I
assume that hidden taxes will typically be shifted somewhat from producers to consumers, so that
there will be at least some producer surplus. See Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 47-50 (projecting that
incidence of hidden taxes will be shifted towards those who are unaware of tax).
98. For those who want slightly more detail, this welfare-increasing result assumes that, as we
move from a perfectly transparent tax equilibrium to some hidden tax equilibrium, 8Sp + 8U, > 8Sc;
that is, that the new utility resulting from transfer of the additional tax from payors to beneficiaries of
government spending, combined with the changes in producer surplus, exceed any losses in consumer
surplus. Under a benevolent government where taxes and spending increase welfare, this means that
hidden taxes will sometimes overall improve social welfare even where consumers are harmed more
than producers are benefitted by the hidden tax.
Because of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, the tradeoff will become less attractive as
producers or government beneficiaries become wealthier than consumers. One obvious way to help
ensure that the ledger balances between beneficiaries and consumers is to include compensation for
hidden taxpayers as part of the resulting government expenditure.
99. Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 41-46.
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This analysis also leads to my own policy prescription for hidden taxes,
which I believe is new to the literature. The shape of the supply and
demand curves will affect the size of consumer and producer surplus: for
inelastically demanded goods, where the demand curve is fairly flat,
consumer surplus is smaller than producer surplus, and vice versa. 100 Thus,
we can predict that hidden taxes are more likely to be welfare-increasing
for inelastically demanded goods. Relatedly, we can minimize any welfare
losses resulting from transfers from relatively poorer consumers to
comparatively richer producers by reserving hidden taxes for markets
where those who benefit from hidden taxes are no wealthier than those
who might lose welfare. 101
In short, under our working set of assumptions there is a significant
possibility that many hidden taxes will on net increase social welfare.
Unfortunately, those assumptions have a large hole in them. It is possible
that, depending on what drives the behavioral changes associated with
hidden taxes, those taxes in fact might become more visible as they grow
larger, which would make any potential welfare gains rather small. Thus, I
tum now to considering the possible mechanisms that lead taxpayers to
overlook hidden taxes.

D. Conflicting Theories of Taxpayer Cognition
At present it is unclear what mental processes are driving the
behavioral effects of hidden taxes. Taxpayers may neglect to consider tax
unintentionally-for example, because they simply cannot carry out the
mental computations required to assess the tax accurately. Alternatively,
taxpayers might deliberately ignore tax, as a way of avoiding the disutility
they would experience from taking the time to weigh their options. I call
these possibilities the "unintentional" and "intentional" models of hidden
taxes, respectively. As we shall see, the question of which model is more
accurate proves to be highly important in making predictions about the
effects of hidden taxes outside areas that have currently been subjected to
empirical study.

I00. In the instance where there are income-effect distortions, it is not technically accurate to refer
to a single "consumer surplus," but the description here still captures the essence of what is going on in
that scenario, as well.
IO I. I use "consumers" and "producer" in my discussion here, but the reader should understand
that in a given market it may be producers who fail to recognize the existence of a hidden tax. In those
markets, there will be producer, rather than consumer, surplus. The labor market seems a likely
example here.
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Chetty et al. outline a rational ignorance model of hidden taxes. 102 In
their description, ignoring tax is rational where the utility cost of
computing the tax is greater than the discounted present value of making a
decision informed by the correct tax amount. Take a purchaser shopping in
a drug store, who must decide whether or not to buy a comb on display by
the register, with a posted price of $1.89. He is aware that there is an
additional sales tax on the comb of 6.5%. He is willing to pay $2.00 for
the comb, but not more. The value to him of making the correct
consumption decision here is tiny; if he overpays, it is only by a few cents.
Quite plausibly, our shopper is willing to pay a few cents to avoid the
mental effort of multiplying 1.89 by .065.
While Chetty et al. do not emphasize time discounting, that, too, is an
important factor. 103 The main cost to the shopper of overpaying is that his
budget for other consumption is now smaller. However, that other
consumption in all likelihood will happen hours, days, or months after the
comb decision. So, arguably, the rational consumer should discount the
value of making a "correct," tax-informed consumption decision to
account for the fact that it arrives much later than the cost of computing
the tax.
On the other hand, studies of consumer behavior suggest strongly that
individuals respond to cognitively complex pricing in ways that are
difficult to explain as having been rationally chosen. 104 For example, there
are very large gaps in the price of credit between those who receive the
best and worst rates, even controlling for credit risk and similar factors. 105
Under a rational model, that would imply that the disutility of thinking
about finances is on the order of thousands of dollars for many of the
disadvantaged borrowers, which seems an implausibly large figure. 106

102. Chetty et al., supra note JO, at 41--42. This is also the approach taken, albeit with less detail,
by Lohmann & Weiss, supra note 17, at 609.
103. See Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 3-4 (explaining significance of time
discounting for costly decision making models).
104. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and
Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision Makers, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS A."1D ITS
APPLICATIONS 7, 28 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007); Kahneman, supra note 13, at
1468-69; DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 19; Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 11-13.
· I 05. Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit-Card
Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1327, 1327 (1995); David Laibson et al., A Debt Puzzle, in
KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION, AND EXPECTATIONS IN MODERN MACROECONOMICS: IN HONOR OF
EDMUNDS. PHELPS 228, 228-29 (Phillippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003); Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age
of Reason: Financial Decisions Over the Lifecycle 38 (Feb. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973790); see also sources cited supra
note 57.
106. See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in FANNIE MAE
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Alternatively, as some behavioral economists have posited, these results
make sense if the borrowers have extremely high discount rates-that is,
they value current gains and losses much, much more than those even in
the near future. 107 Indeed, there is now extensive evidence that most
people are disproportionately sensitive to small, immediate costs; that is
one of the reasons we procrastinate even essential tasks. 108 There is
considerable debate among economists and others whether we should view
these behaviors as irrational in the sense that they do not maximize
subjective welfare. 109 For my purposes here, it is not hugely important
whether these kinds of irrational decisions reduce subjective welfare; the
point is that the taxpayer's response to a hidden tax may not be the result
of considered reflection at the time of her decision, and may instead be
difficult for her to control. 110
There are a variety of mental processes that might cause individuals
unintentionally to ignore a tax. Most simply, taxpayers may know the tax
rate but lack the computational skills to compute its effects. 111 Or, as with
the credit card story, they may be "hyperbolic" discounters who place little
value on future events, so that the current mental effort of computing tax

FOUNDATION, FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 37
(200 I) (reporting that individuals who could qualify for lower-cost loans took out subprime loans at
high rates); DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 19 (estimating that cost of biased choice of investment was
approximately $6,000); id. at 30-31 (noting that fact that information individuals overlooked was
available for nothing make "a rational interpretation of the findings less plausible"); Agarwal et al.,
supra note 105, at 38.
107. GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF SUCCESSIVE
MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON Ch.3 (1992); Gregory Berns et al., /ntertemporal
Choice-Toward an Integrative Framework, 11 TRENDS COG. SCI. 482, 483 (2007); Jonathan Gruber
& Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier, 5 ADVANCES IN ECON. ANAL. &
POL'Y I, 2 (2005).
108. George A. Akerloff, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. I, 1-19 (1991);
David A. Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443, 443-77 (1997);
DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 9; see also Carl A. Kogut, Consumer Search Behavior and Sunk Costs,
14 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 381, 381 (1990) (stating that consumers appear overly sensitive to costs
of conducting search for right choice).
109. See Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 104, at 8-9; Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 95, at 1-2;
compare Richard Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV.
803, 823-31 (2008) with Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN.
L. REv. 749, 763 (2008). My own view is that while these behaviors may be "rational" in the sense
that they reflect consumers' short-term expressed preferences, from the middle- or long-term
perspective they reduce overall welfare.
110. Of course, since my overall inquiry here is whether hidden taxes can increase social welfare,
it does matter whether unintentional tax decisions reduce the subjective welfare of the taxpayer. But,
as I argue supra text accompanying notes 86-101, any diminution in welfare the taxpayer suffers as a
result of a "wrong" purchase decision is likely to be relatively small compared to other social welfare
gains that result.
111. Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 104, at 25; Kahneman, supra note 13, at 1453, 1459, 1464;
Read et al., supra note 96, at 187; Agarwal et al., supra note 105, at 39.
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looms much larger in their decision than the later benefit of paying a lower
price. 112 The framing of a hidden tax may make it seem smaller. 113
Alternatively, people may keep separate "mental accounts" of retail prices
and taxes, as in the McCaffery and Baron studies, and therefore struggle to
integrate the two when they have to make a purchase decision. 114 Finally,
taxpayers may form their decision to buy based on the first price they see,
perhaps in order to avoid internal conflict with their desire to make a
purchase. 115 What these scenarios have in common is that in all of them it
makes little difference whether the expected utility of avoiding the tax
exceeds the disutility of calculating it.
There is no clear-cut evidence to establish either of these models as
more prevalent than the other. Again, there is some limited real-world
evidence that irrational behaviors persist regardless of the financial stakes
in some non-tax situations. 116 Laboratory studies are probably of limited
use, because the stakes are generally too low to induce rationally ignorant
participants to exert effort. For example, some marketing laboratory
studies have found that participants whose test performances indicated that
they found cognition less effortful also were better at spotting hidden
fees. 117 Others find the opposite. 118
Whether the intentional or unintentional model better depicts taxpayer
behavior is central to many important questions about hidden taxes. Most
crucially, the rational model likely implies that hidden taxes cannot be a
major component of government budgets. Unless taxpayers place an
extremely high premium on avoiding tax calculations, any large tax
savings will motivate the rational taxpayer to haul out their calculator or

112. See Berns et al., supra note 107, at 482-83; Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and
Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351, 352-401 (2002); Della Vigna, supra note
13, at 3-5.
113. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 190-91; McCaffery & Baron, supra note 7, at 290;
Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 15-16 (noting studies in which consumers were less responsive to
surcharges they had to remember, to surcharges listed in percentages, and to surcharges shown in a
small font).
114. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 7, at 290-91; see Kahneman, supra note 13, at 1459.
115. Juan D. Carrillo & Thomas Mariotti, Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device, 67
REV. ECON. STUD. 529, 529, 531, 541 (2000); Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 30-31 (suggesting that
consumers "anchor" on base price as explanation for why they ignore even fees that are stated right
next to the base price); see also Kahneman, supra note 13, at 1469 (arguing that individuals may prefer
to invest effort in bolstering their wrong decision rather than analyzing it).
116. See supra note I 06.
117. Amar Cheema, Surcharges and Seller Reputation, 35 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 167, 173
(2008). Note that the fact that participants find cognition effortful does not mean that they are
unskilled at reasoning, and vice-versa. So these studies probably suggest little about the unintentional
model.
118. Morwitz et al., supra note 47, at 20-22.
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call their accountant. 119 This suggests in turn that hidden taxes would not
be a solution to the dilemma of progressive taxation. By definition,
progressive taxes impose large burdens on high-earners, and under a
rational model hidden taxes do not change behavior when the stakes are
large. Which model is accurate also informs other crucial questions about
hidden taxes, as I will now attempt to show.
Ill. ARE HIDDEN TAXES REALLY HIDDEN?
To this point we have a provisional theory that hidden taxes may
overall increase social welfare. Although the most basic story for why
hidden taxes reduce deadweight losses is straightforward, there are at least
two important potential complications. First, even if taxpayers sometimes
fail to notice taxes at the point of sale, it remains possible that hidden taxes
will not overall have any significant effect on the net burden of taxation
because taxpayers expect that there will be a hidden tax and act
accordingly. In addition, taxpayers may quickly learn to recognize hidden
taxes, so that any efficiency gains would be short-lived.

A. Do Taxpayers Anticipate Hidden Taxes?
If taxpayers anticipate that the government will have a later opportunity
to impose unnoticed taxes, the taxpayers may behave as if tax is imposed,
regardless of whether they can identify the subsequent tax. 120 Indeed, we
can extend this analysis to the possibility that if the government can give
no guarantees that it will limit the tax it imposes, and the taxpayer believes
she will be unable to discern tax, she may behave as though tax is imposed
even where it is not. Thus, a universe in which the taxpayer is aware of the
potential for hidden taxes may be even less efficient than one in which all
taxes are visible.
To understand this possibility it is helpful to consider the context in
which hidden taxes are likely to produce different behavior than obvious
taxes. Notwithstanding the startling Chetty et al. study, we should expect
that where taxes form a component of price they will not likely affect
short-run consumption decisions. 121 If I am willing to pay $400 for my

119. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at 758; Chetty et al., supra note 10, at 35, 40.
120. Finkelstein, Working Paper, supra note 15 (manuscript at 3).
121. Justin Marion & Erich Muehlegger, Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory
Innovation: Tax Evasion and the Dyeing of Untaxed Diesel, 116 J. POL. ECON. 633, 635 n.2 (2008).
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iPhone, I am probably willing to pay $400, whatever the components of
the final price tag. 122
The more plausible scenario, then, is one in which prices are hidden at
the time of the relevant decision. 123 When I invest in developing my
potential for future revenue-say, by obtaining a J.D. degree-I may be
unaware of the effects of the AMT, payroll taxes, credit and deduction
phaseouts and the like on my supposedly greater earning capabilities. 124 At
the time I decide whether or not to move to Florida, I may be unaware that
the combination of the state's dozens of separate sales taxes and excises
may exceed the total tax burden, for me, of an income tax in Georgia.
Because Georgia's tax is more salient, it has a larger effect on my decision
about where to relocate. But I won't incur either state's tax until after my
decision is already complete.
This latter scenario may bring to mind the literature on the competition
for corporate charters. As Roberta Romano explains, states cannot induce
a firm to relocate simply by offering an opportunity for superior returns, as
through a corporate charter. 125 Rational firms will be aware that, once
having moved, they may be subject to being held up by the state for the
rents (i.e., extra profits) produced by the superior charter. Accordingly, in
order to bring in new firms, the state must credibly commit not to later
impose confiscatory taxes. 126
Something of this sort may be afoot with taxpayers facing the
possibility of low-salience taxes on future investment returns. If the
taxpayer is aware that taxes can be hidden, but unsure if she herself is able
to detect a tax on her decision, she may well act as if the decision would
be subject to tax. As Finkelstein notes, the government can overcome this
tendency by offering a credible commitment that the decision in fact is not
taxed to the extent the taxpayer has assumed. 127 But, in the absence of such
assurances, taxpayers may abstain from efficient investment even if that

I 22. This Article takes no position on whether shelling out 400 bucks for a telephone with some
cool gadgets is rational behavior. But they are very, very cool gadgets.
123. This story is consistent with Chetty et al. if the relevant time of decision for most consumers
is in the aisle, rather than at the register.
124. Relatedly, Professor Oates surveys the limited data on whether the future tax burden of
existing debt is fully impounded in housing prices. Oates, supra note 8, at 76-77.
125. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 225, 235-50 (1985). For later elaboration, see Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate
Law, 162 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 150 (2006); Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G.
MacIntosh, The Role of lnterjurisdictional Competition in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 141, 147-48 (2000).
126. Romano, supra note 125, at 235-36.
127. Finkelstein, Working Paper, supra note 15 (manuscript at 3-4).
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investment in fact is not taxed, just as corporations may refuse to
reincorporate in Delaware, irrespective of potential gains.
In the absence of central coordination, credible commitments may be
rare. As a general rule, individual politicians cannot credibly commit not
to raise taxes, because the immediate rewards of fulfilling their personal
policy goals are likely to be larger than any discounted future reputational
costs. 128 Further, if local officials are judged by the yardstick of the
tax/service basket offered by neighbors, each jurisdiction will have
incentives to hide their own taxes to appear to be a better bargain to their
electorate and potential investors. 129 Political parties, which are long-term
repeat players dependant on their reputations, are more believable. 130 But
there is a large degree of slack between parties and their elected officials,
especially between national parties and local officials. 131 If the public is
aware of this slack, then at first cut we should expect taxpayers to respond
anticipatorily to taxes they cannot directly perceive.
In fact, though, there are other significant problems with the
anticipation story, especially if the unintentional theory of hidden taxes
proves the most prevalent one. First, if taxpayers do not compute the effect
of tax because the computation is beyond their cognitive ability, they
probably cannot perform the computation anticipatorily, either.
Second, where taxpayers are irrational the anticipation scenario appears
to assume taxpayers in a strange twilight of partial self-awareness. In order
to anticipate a hidden tax that may never arise, the taxpayers must be
aware of the likelihood of their own inability to accurately process tax
information. At the same time, they must expect that they will not be able
to in tum leverage that awareness into an effective strategy for "debiasing," or overcoming the cognitive shortcoming. 132 Still, this may not
be wildly implausible. Some data indicate that individuals may be aware
both of their own self-control problems and their inability to overcome
them. 133 Rather than curbing the self-indulgent behavior, the individual

128. See Gilat Levy, A Model of Political Parties, 115 J. ECON. THEORY 250, 251 (2002); see also
Enriqueta Arigones et al., Political Reputations and Campaign Promises 3 (Jan. 10, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/-apostlew/paper/pdf/APP09-2005.pdf).
129. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and
Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 26 (1995). On yardstick competition generally, see
Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319-27 (1985).
130. Levy, supra note 128, at 253, 269; see also Daron Acemoglu, Why not a Political Coase
Theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 620, 622 (2003 ).
131. James M. Snyder, Jr. & Michael M. Ting, An Informational Rationale for Political Parties,
46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 90, 91 (2002).
132. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at n.49, 779.
133. Benabou & Tirole, supra note 13, at 139; Read et al., supra note 96, at 189-90.
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pre-commits to a second-best outcome in which she will not be tempted. 134
A decision not to invest, in the face of potential hidden and undiscoverable
tax liability, could be a form of binding oneself to the mast. Other
taxpayers, though, may never be aware that they underestimate their
taxes. 135 For decisions made by these taxpayers, at least, hidden taxes
should reduce deadweight losses.
Turning to intentional tax-ignorers, here again only a select few
taxpayers will likely anticipate a hidden tax. Recall that
consumer/taxpayers may reduce their response to an opaque tax out of a
desire to avoid cognitive effort. 136 If so, and this response is simply a
rational comparison of the utility of mental effort against the expected
value of fully-informed consumption decisions, then a taxpayer's
anticipation of the tax will do little to change the result. Either the
calculation is worth the effort, or it is not. If anything, anticipation would
reduce the likelihood that the taxpayer will undertake any effort, since the
present discounted value of the correct consumption decision will diminish
with the greater lead time between the calculation and the time of
consumption and resulting budget changes. 137
On the other hand, if it is possible to economize on future calculations
with an anticipatory calculation, then of course anticipation might increase
responsiveness to the tax. This is a difficult scenario for which to imagine
examples, but perhaps it might describe a choice to reside in a jurisdiction
with low or no sales taxes, or a selection of a business method that
demands fewer rather than more purchases. In those rare cases, the
taxpayer can economize on a large bundle of later calculations by making
one gestalt estimate in advance. 138 However, the mental process of
determining when anticipation would be worthwhile is itself costly, so that
taxpayers may sometimes pass up chances to make effort-saving
anticipatory calculations. 139 Thus, the degree to which taxpayers anticipate
hidden taxes, and the forms of tax they anticipate, may depend on what
causes the behavioral effects of hidden tax for that individual.

134. George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Self-Control, in CHOICE OVER TIME 187-88 (George F.
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); Gruber & Mullainathan, supra note 107, at 20; DellaVigna,
supra note 13, at 5-6. On pre-commitment strategies generally, see JON ELSTER, ODYSSEUS AND THE
SIRENS 36-111 (1979).
135. Cf Gruber & Mullainathan, supra note 107, at 20-21 (arguing that the authors' findings fit
best with models in which individuals are unaware of the extent of their own self-control problems).
136. See supra text accompanying notes I 02-10.
137. See Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 4.
138. For analysis of a similar possibility in the context of legislative decisions, see Brian Galle,
Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323, 1366-67 (2008).
139. Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 5.
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In any event, if we can expect any taxpayers to anticipate hidden taxes,
it remains possible that they will estimate fairly small tax increases. Under
this theory, taxpayers should change their behavior in response not to the
current perceived tax rate, but the largest anticipated hidden tax. As I
explore in the next section, we can likely expect, at most, relatively small
increases in overall tax levels as a result of hidden taxes. If that is accurate,
it likely will cabin, but probably not eliminate, the potential for taxpayer
anticipated responses to hidden taxes. Taxpayers may still be deterred
from committing to behaviors that would be subject to tax, to an extent
similar to the distortions that would attend a fully visible tax. By reducing
the size of the largest likely hidden tax, the constraints make it somewhat
less likely that hidden taxes will significantly magnify distortions.
In short, there is thus far a theoretical possibility that hidden taxes can
reduce deadweight losses. Taxpayer anticipation of hidden taxes would
eliminate these welfare gains. But it is unclear whether any significant
number of taxpayers in fact are aware of their own irrationality and are
capable of acting rationally in response. Moreover, the danger of very
large welfare losses from anticipated hidden taxes appears somewhat
limited.
In addition, if anticipatory responses prove a major barrier to the
usefulness of hidden taxes, there are policy interventions that can mitigate
the anticipation problem. For example, we might require each jurisdiction
to disclose its total tax burden, broken down by taxpayer demographics.
This would keep individual tax instruments hidden, while setting an upper
limit on the degree to which any given activity is subject to tax. The
disclosure regime would also largely remove the negative extemality
hidden taxes impose (via yardstick comparisons) on neighboring officials,
increasing the credibility of official promises not to impose such taxes.

B. Learning and De-biasing
Another possible qualification to the basic claim that hidden taxes
increase welfare is the possibility that taxes might not remain hidden.
Individuals who bear economic burdens as a result of their biases have an
incentive to correct their misperceptions. 140 If individuals can readily debias themselves then any welfare gains from hidden taxes are likely to be

140. Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1620, 1647--48 (2006); Libor Dusek, Do Governments Grow
When They Become More Efficient? Evidence from Tax Withholding 12 (Feb. 12, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.cerge.cuni.cz/pdf/events/papers/030225 _t.pdf).
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fleeting. Obviously, this is a qualification that is most pertinent for the
unintentional model of hidden tax.
The possibility of de-biasing rests on taxpayer access to good sources
of feedback. 141 Absent some hint that their perceptions are inaccurate,
biased taxpayers have no way of knowing that they are misperceiving
reality. At present, we do not know how self-aware biased taxpayers are.
There is, though, some limited empirical data from other related fields,
which I will return to momentarily.
Of course, people can learn by word of mouth as well as through their
own experiences. 142 This mechanism, too, has its problems. Peers who are
not biased can be cross-subsidized by those who are; that is, the unbiased
may benefit at the expense of their fellows. 143 For example, the general
public may pay a lower overall rate because some subgroup
disproportionately fails to avoid the tax. As a result, those who see clearly
may have financial incentives to keep their knowledge to themselves. 144
And where learning depends on personal characteristics of the taxpayer,
such as their own willpower, information from others may not be very
useful. 145
Even with feedback, taxpayers may misunderstand the lessons of their
experience. Some signals are "noisy"-they arrive mixed together with
other information. 146 Taxpayers who do not fully understand what
happened to them, whether because the signal is noisy or because their
own perception is faulty, may not recognize feedback or may fail to use it
properly. 147 Confirmation bias, the tendency to take in new information
selectively to reinforce prior decisions, in particular may be a serious
obstacle to learning. 148

141. See Benabou & Tirole, supra note 13, at 139; Klick & Mitchell, supra note 140, at 1632-34;
Sumit Agarwal et al., Leaming in the Credit Card Market 3, 17 (Feb. 8, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= I091623).
142. Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 104, at 40; Sausgruber & Tyran, supra note 66, at 3.
143. See Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 37 n.29.
144. Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 37 n.29. This dynamic points up one
problem with some of the laboratory studies. For instance, in Sausgruber & Tyran, supra note 66, at 3,
the authors find that group deliberation sometimes improves participants' ability to spot a hidden tax.
But, unlike the real world, participants in the study did not have any way to benefit from the fact that
they were better at spotting taxes than their fellows. E.g., id. at 6 (noting that participants were told
that tax revenues were not returned to them or anyone else in study).
145. Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 8-9.
146. Klick & Mitchell, supra note 140, at 1633; DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 50-51; see Jennifer
L. Romich, Difficult Calculations: Low-Income Workers and Marginal Tax Rates, 80 Soc. SERV. REV.
27, 52 (2006) (setting out factors that make learning difficult for low-income workers, such as multiple
overlapping phaseouts and highly individualized rules determining them).
147. Sausgruber & Tyran, supra note 66, at 3.
148. Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Misperception in Choosing Medicare Drug Plans 18 (Aug. 25, 2008)
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Taxpayers who lack feedback cues can potentially also be de-biased by
others, such as policy entrepreneurs. Political rivals of the incumbent taxsetters may reveal hidden taxes in order to activate opposition to the
existing distribution of tax burdens. 149 On the other hand, in commercial
settings, competitors have sometimes chosen not to de-bias their rivals'
clienteles. 150 Rivals may prefer not to de-bias in order to maintain their
own opportunities for extracting rents from the biased consumer. 151
Conceivably, this same dynamic could be true in the political market. 152
Additionally, to the extent that de-biasing does create market opportunities
for competitors, it likely creates those same opportunities for all
competitors, giving rise to a free-rider problem. 153 In that instance, there is
no market actor with an incentive to provide consumers with more
accurate information about the costs and benefits of their consumption
choices.
This free-rider story may be somewhat less true of political actors. As
with voter ignorance more generally, taxpayer biases create opportunities
for political entrepreneurs to supply information to the voter in exchange
for political rewards. 154 Free rider effects at times will be diminished in the
political context because of the limited space for competition. 155 For
instance, if I am running to oust an incumbent governor, I may well wish
to reveal to the public the full extent of their tax burden. There will be

(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington University Law Review) (stating that elderly
medicare recipients tended not to switch from suboptimal plans, partly due to confirmation bias).
149. See Donald Wittman, Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1395,
1400 (1989). Thus, in the likely event that hidden taxes are not perfectly distributed throughout the
population (about which more in Part IV), entrepreneurs may opportunistically de-bias even in the
event that hidden taxes do not change the overall tax level.
150. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 506-07 (2006).
151. See id. at 508-09 & n.9, 519-20; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: A Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 336-37 (2001)
(noting that a manufacturer that educates consumers about safety features of rival products can also
reduce demand for its own).
152. Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates, and the
"SALT" Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 820-21 (2008). But see Stephen Coate & Stephen Morris,
On the Fann of Transfers to Special Interests, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1210, 1212 (1995) (arguing that
voters cannot be persistently fooled). Note that in order for hidden taxes to persist, they need not fool
the same people over time; all that is needed is for new taxpayers to encounter and fail to recognize the
hidden tax.
153. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation a/Consumer
Infonnation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 527 (1981); Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 150, at 525-27; BarGill, supra note 55, at I 0. For some qualifications to the free-rider story, see Richard A. Epstein,
Behavioral Economics: Human E"or and Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 120 (2006).
154. See Coate & Morris, supra note 152, at 1230; Wittman, supra note 149, at 1400.
155. Cf Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 150, at 527 ("[S)hrouding is more pervasive when the
market is less competitive.").
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relatively few other politicians (assuming, as is almost universally true in
the United States, that there is no serious third-party candidate) who can
benefit in the near term from that disclosure to nearly the degree I would,
so there is no one upon whose efforts I can free ride. Even where there is
potential for free riding, being among the first to reveal information about
hidden taxes might be valuable as a form of branding, in much the same
way that being seen as an "innovator" might be a spur to local officials to
be first movers even in the presence of large beneficial spillovers. 156
Entrepreneurs do, however, face a credibility problem. False claims
about hidden taxes are so difficult to discern that entrepreneurs cannot
credibly commit to telling the truth. 157 This is likely the case under both
the intentional- and unintentional-tax-ignorer theories of hidden taxes.
Unintentional taxpayers by definition lack the ability to verify the
entrepreneurs' claims. If they are aware of their shortcomings, they will
distrust claims by would-be entrepreneurs. Rational taxpayers, too, will
not engage in the effort to verify entrepreneurs' claims, because, also by
definition, it is not worth the necessary mental effort to do so. And both
groups will be subject to the usual free-rider problems of public choice
theory. 158
Of course, not all voters will themselves recognize this dynamic. But
even those who do not will typically be confronted with conflicting claims
from entrepreneurs and their political targets. 159 The taxpayers' inability to
recognize which denials are true will greatly diminish the effectiveness of
any efforts at de-biasing.
In sum, this is yet another theoretical point with no clear conclusion,
and room for important empirical work. The evidence so far, in studies of
other forms of consumer behavior, implies a fair bit of learning among
consumers; although learning is slow, often forgotten, and eventually

156. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking & Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 614 (1980). For some qualifications to the reputational story, see Brian Galle &
Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 57
EMORY L.J. 1333, 1346--98 (2009).
157. Coate & Morris, supra note 152, at 1230. That is, voters may simply refuse to credit
politicians who in effect must ask, "Who you gonna believe? Me, or your own eyes?" DUCK SOUP
(Paramount Pictures 1933).
158. In brief, the theory is that there is a free rider effect among voters, which diminishes as the
affected group shrinks, information becomes more readily available, and the size of the effect of a
given policy on the relevant group increases. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC Gooos AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 21-2, 31, 35 (1971). Thus, voters who stand to gain a
large benefit at the expense of a small, hidden, widely dispersed cost to other voters are likely to
prevail, as they will be very active lobbyists while the victims of the policy will be indifferent. Id.
159. That is, in all likelihood politicians accused of imposing hidden taxes will deny it.
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swamped by the cognitive effects of aging. 16 For example, Agarwal et al.
report that consumers learn well in the short term, forget the lessons of the
recent past in the medium term, but over the long term cumulatively do
manage to lower their costs of borrowing. 161 In a separate study, they find
that, controlling for income, individual fixed effects, and the like, the
average price consumers pay for credit is U-shaped over an age
distribution. 162 That is, young and old pay more for similar credit products
than those who are middle-aged. They argue that this pattern can be
explained by a combination of learning over a lifetime and declining
cognitive powers, producing a peak point in middle age. 163 Whether these
results translate to the tax field remains an open question.
On the whole, it appears as though the basic story of efficient hidden
taxes holds up reasonably well. The contours of the story do vary
considerably depending on the rationality or irrationality of taxpayers. But
tax-anticipatory behavior seems somewhat limited, and there are both
theoretical and empirical bases for concluding that a fair segment of the
taxpaying public will neglect the effects of hidden taxes.
IV. POTENTIAL WELFARE LOSSES FROM HIDDEN T AXA TI ON
While low-salience taxes have the potential to diminish deadweight
losses, there are also several possible countervailing effects. I have already
mentioned that, as the literature has recognized, hidden taxes can cause
consumers to misallocate their budgets, resulting in welfare losses. 164 In
this Part, I add two additional sources of potential welfare losses. First,
because government policy is not set by unanimous consent, distortions in
the decisions of the outcome-determining voters can reduce welfare for
everyone. Or, put in a more familiar way, where taxes are hidden,

160. James J. Choi et al., Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior 4 (Yale Int'! Ctr. For
Fin., Working Paper No. 09-01, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=IOl4655; Agarwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 2, 27; Agarwal et al., supra
note 141, at 2-3, 17; see also Motwitz et al., supra note 47, at 9 (discussing growing consumer
awareness of hidden fees). In several studies of consumer response to shipping fees, more experienced
customers performed no better than beginners at spotting hidden fees. Cheema, supra note 117; Clark
& Ward, supra note 49.
161. Agatwal et al., supra note 141, at 3.
162. Agatwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 2; see also Gabaix & Laibson, supra note
150, at 522-23.
163. Agatwal et al., Age of Reason, supra note 105, at 27-29. Alternatively, they mention in
passing that their results may be at least partly driven by access to advice from an individual's social
network. Id. at 29 n.22. Which story proves right does not seem to be important to the hidden tax
results.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
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government may be larger than optimal. Second, this paper adds to the
literature by considering possible welfare effects of the incidence of
hidden taxes. If hidden taxes are mostly paid by the poor, they will likely
reduce overall social welfare; I argue here that whether that is true turns on
the cognitive mechanisms that drive hidden taxation.

A. Too Much Government?
So far we have assumed that hidden taxes do not affect the total tax
revenues taken in by government. It has long been argued, though, that
where taxes are less salient, political opposition to self-serving tax
increases by government officials will also decline, leading to overprovision of government. 165 This argument is quite similar to the Chetty et
al. claim about distortions in consumer choice: here, the distortion is in the
voter's choice of how much government expenditure to consume. The
difference is that it is not only the individual consumer who is affected by
excess government, but also everyone who pays taxes. Moreover, if
government power to tax is limited by competition with other
governments, then excess taxation in one jurisdiction or tier of government
may lead to over-taxation in others. 166 In short, in the special case of
consumption of government services, the individual's failure to observe a
tax creates a possible negative externality for others. 167 There are a number
of uncertainties behind this hypothesis, however.
First, the externality argument assumes that the decision by one person
to consume a certain amount of government services affects the amount of
services others receive. This is a plausible assumption in many cases for
government provision of public goods in democracies. For example, a
common model of how governments determine the amount of government
goods to provide is that they attempt to match the preferences of the
median voter, the voter exactly in the middle of the range of all voter
preferences. 168

165. See supra note 7.
166. See Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High
Tax Rates?, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 363, 364-65 (2002).
167. Thus, we should predict that intentional tax-ignorers will ignore taxes where it would
maximize social welfare for them to pay attention. Similarly, unintentional tax-ignorers will underinvest (from a societal perspective) in de-biasing efforts.
168. For a general discussion and a review of the empirical evidence supporting the median voter
theory, see Roger 0. Congleton, The Median Voter Model, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
CHOICE 382, 382-86 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
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Yet median voter theory is ambiguous as to whether a change in
salience will alter tax levels. Imagine that voters are aligned left to right in
order of increasing preference for tax. Lower salience will tend to shift
voters to the left. However, if these shifts do not move any voters across
the unbiased median-for instance, if everyone who is biased is to the left
or far to the right of the median-then there will be no change in the
expressed preferences for the size of government.
Alternatives to the median voter model are also theoretically
indeterminate on the effect of hidden taxes. Buchanan argues, famously,
that under so-called "public choice" assumptions, in which intensity of
voter interest matters to the political outcome, lower tax salience will
increase tax rates. 169 He claims that diminished visibility of taxes will
increase the likelihood that individual taxpayers will free-ride on the
efforts of others to oppose any tax increase. 170
But this analysis overlooks two key points. For one, Buchanan appears
to assume that voters will be unaware that taxes are hidden from others. If
a rational voter predicts that others will not act because they do not notice
the tax, that rational voter will conclude she cannot free ride on the efforts
of the ignorant others and thus will be more motivated to act herself. Thus,
if taxes are hidden from some but less than all of the population, political
opposition might actually rise. 171
Secondly, Buchanan takes for granted that hidden taxes will only
deactivate tax opponents. Some voters, though, might prefer higher

169. Buchanan, supra note 59, at 135.
170. Id.; see also BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 24-32 (making this argument about
voter ignorance of taxes more generally).
171. It might be argued in response that in a repeated lobbying game, taxpayers will still not
lobby. The idea is that if I lobby, you will be able to observe my lobbying behavior, and therefore
learn that there are hidden taxes. We then will be back in a world where taxes are not hidden, and
neither ofus lobbies. Anticipating this, I do not lobby.
The game plays out differently, however, if (as seems likely) it is possible for me to hide my
lobbying activity from you. In that case, my best strategy is both to lobby and to hide my lobbying.
The reason is that, if we cannot observe one another's mental states, you may think that taxes are
hidden from me. If you do not see me lobby, you, too, might lobby. Hiding my lobbying from you
therefore increases the chances you will provide me with additional lobbying against an unwanted tax.
However, since there is only a possibility that you will lobby, I still must exert some lobbying effort
myself.
Another possible objection to my lobbying analysis in the main text is that those who do lobby
may do so only for their own benefit. Thus, special interests from whom taxes are not hidden might
lobby simply for carve-outs for themselves, shifting the tax burden to those from whom tax is hidden.
(I am grateful to Tom Griffith for making this point). This strikes me as entirely plausible. A possible
solution, though, would be to make special-purpose carveouts more difficult, as by requiring them to
be enacted through very clear statutory language. See Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax
Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 381-85 (2006). In that way, any special-interest lobbying
would be more likely to benefit the population as a whole.
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taxes-for example, those who know that they themselves will pay little.
Hiding taxes from these voters will diminish public support for these kinds
of redistributions, thereby reducing tax levels.
A second set of uncertainties is centered around the possibility that
lower tax salience may interfere with some of the mechanisms thought to
constrain government opportunities to impose higher taxes. Under the socalled "Leviathan" theories of government tax-setting, competition
between governments for mobile citizens limits the rate at which
government officials can self-interestedly expand the tax base. 172
Evidently the assumption is that at least some citizens who individually
lack the power to exercise their political voice in opposition to a tax may
nonetheless be alert enough to their fiscal situation to exit an undesirable
regime. 173 A low-salience tax would arguably diminish the efficacy of this
exit constraint, either by further reducing the degree to which taxpayers
became aware of their own jurisdiction's high taxes, or increasing the
likelihood that they would unwittingly relocate to another jurisdiction that
itself had high, hidden taxes. On the other hand, hidden taxes might
diminish the rewards, if any, for a jurisdiction that sought to attract those
that preferred higher taxes. Similarly, if voters determine the appropriate
size of their own government by reference to "yardsticks" in other
jurisdictions, the prevalence of hidden taxes at home or in neighboring
locales would distort accurate measurements. 174 Some, but not necessarily
all, of these distortions might be in the direction of higher taxes.
Hidden taxes can potentially also interfere with tax-setting in a pure
Tiebout model, under which government officials are not necessarily selfinterested.175 Rather, the officials simply are the first-movers in a Lindahllike tax-setting mechanism, with officials in each jurisdiction offering a
basket of goods and services, and in which taxpayers reveal their

172. BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 203-12. For overviews of the literature, see John
Douglas Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 291, 296-98 (1999); Jeffery S.
Zax, ls There a Leviathan in Your Neighborhood?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 560-67 (1989).
173. See BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 206-07 (assuming that taxpayers can exit
regime in response to tax). One argument offered in defense of this assumption is that free-riding is
more pervasive for "voice" than for "exit." See Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and
Constitutional Design, 28 Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 11-15, on file with
the Washington University Law Review). That is, voting or otherwise participating in local
government produces externalities for others, leading to free riding. A migrant who learns negative
information about her government, on the other hand, can act on that information by moving to a new
jurisdiction, thereby capturing for herself most of the gains from that information. Id. if, however, outmigration is an important source of information to those who remain or might follow, there is still a
large positive externality even for exit.
174. On yardstick competition generally, see Besley & Case, supra note 129, at 26.
I 75. See supra note 16.
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preferences by selecting their most preferred basket. 176 As I have argued
elsewhere, hidden taxes, taken in combination with other frictions on
relocation, can create complex interactions with the Tiebout mechanism. 177
In general, it is likely that taxpayers will end up in a jurisdiction that fails
to match their preferences. It is entirely possible that in some cases this
distortion may be in the direction of too little government rather than too
much government.
Adding to these uncertainties is that it can be argued in response to the
Leviathan, yardstick, and Tiebout points that government services, too,
can have low salience. 178 Certainly the variety of benefits individuals
receive from government is broken up into hundreds of different
programs. There is experimental evidence that the disaggregation bias also
results in undervaluatiol). of government benefits. 179 Thus, perhaps the low
salience of some taxes in effect restores, rather than itself breaking, the
politics of tax setting. 180
Whatever the reality of these possibilities, there may be still yet other
limits on the size of government that could mitigate any externality from
hidden taxes. If voters vote based on their overall welfare, and hidden
taxes permit taxation at a level higher than the voters would otherwise
have preferred, then even if they do not observe tax levels directly they
may still punish officials for diminishing their basket of private goods.
There is mixed evidence, though, about whether voters in fact engage in
this form of "retrospective" voting. 181
Finally, even if hidden taxes do pose a danger of a government sector
that is too large, or otherwise inefficiently allocated, that danger can be
mitigated by other policy tools. Again, detailed disclosure of the total tax
burden could improve inter-jurisdictional competition; certainly it would
reduce the danger that voters will not be aware of the cost of their basket
of government services. 182 States might also adopt fairly stringent

176. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at 446-56.
177. Galle, supra note 152, at 824-30.
178. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at I 00.
179. McCaffery & Baron, Political Psychology, supra note 62, at 1768-72.
180. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5, at I 00 (making this point about "fiscal illusion"
more generally).
181. See Alberto Alesina & Alex Cukierman, The Politics of Ambiguity, 105 Q. J. ECON. 829,842
(1990); Guido Suurmond et al., On the Bad Reputation of Reputational Concerns, 88 J. PUB. ECON.
2817, 2830 (2004); see generally R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, INFORMATION AND ELECTIONS (1998)
(surveying theories of how voters collect and apply information about candidates); MORRIS P.
FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981) (same).
182. Admittedly, there is substantial room for gamesmanship in any such disclosure. Officials
could shift taxes to other forms, such as user fees or regulatory burdens, in an effort to evade
identifying them. The best that one can say at this stage is that effective implementation would likely
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balanced-budget requirements, super-majority rules for new taxes, or the
like. If these tools prove ineffective, we might employ hidden taxes only at
the federal level. By most accounts, the various tax competition methods
are rather less significant at the national scale, because the costs of exit, at
least for individuals, are too large. 183 Using only national-level hidden
taxes would thus avoid a number of the allocational distortions I have
mentioned.

B. Empirics on Size of Government
Given the confusing state of our theoretical predictions about the effect
of hidden taxes on the size of government expenditures, it would be
helpful to have good empirical data on the question. Unfortunately, the
literature on whether the saliency of taxation affects the size of
government is inconclusive.
In his comprehensive 1988 survey, Oates found that "the ex1stmg
empirical literature has not as yet made a persuasive case for the[]
existence" of what he called "fiscal illusion-the notion that the
systematic misperception of key fiscal parameters may significantly distort
fiscal choices by the electorate." 184 Oates noted that some studies had
found that more "complex" tax systems were correlated with high tax
burdens. 185 But he argued that the causation might run in the opposite
direction from that suggested by fiscal illusion. Preferences for high taxes
produced complex tax structures, he said, because each jurisdiction
competes with its neighbors, so that high sales or property taxes would
drive away consumers or home-buyers, respectively. 186 Thus, to obtain
large revenues, a local jurisdiction necessarily had to have a complex,
many-pronged financing system. One could extend Oates's argument
further, by noting that low marginal rates on many sources are more
efficient than a single, high rate on one source. 187 These alternative
explanations thus far confound efforts to show any relation between voter
confusion over complex tax schemes and high taxes. And other empirical

require a vigilant, neutral third party. That is not, in my view, the same as saying that there will be no
effective implementation.
183. E.g., WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 8 (1972).
184. Oates, supra note 8, at 65-66.
185. Id. at 69-70.
186. Id. at 70-71.
187. Cf Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 1003, 1006-1011 (2001) (making this point in support of argument for using non-tax
redistributive tools).
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efforts, Oates reported, were simply too mixed to draw strong
conclusions. 188
Dollery and Worthington, too, after surveying the literature find no
convincing connection between the visibility of a public finance system
and the size of government. 189 A common theme they report is the
difficulty of specifying an accurate measure of tax salience. For example,
both the complexity of the revenue system and the ease with which
revenues can be increased without rate hikes ("revenue-elasticity") have
eluded easy measurement. 190 And they conclude that the so-called "renter
illusion," in which property taxes are higher where there are more renters
(putatively because renters are less attentive to the tax rate), can also be
explained by rational behavior by renters. 191
Finkelstein frames her discussion as an inquiry into whether electronic
toll collection increases the size of government but in her more detailed
discussion is careful to limit her claim to showing only that toll rates
increased. 192 Without more complete budget information about the tollimposing jurisdictions, we do not know whether increased toll revenue
was offset with tax reductions elsewhere.
Martin and Gabay suggest a possible reason for these inconclusive
results. In order for low salience to translate to higher tax rates and bigger
government, they argue, citizens must fail to connect their tax burden to
their vote for office. 193 Taxes that have no effect on purchases may still
alter voting. 194 For example, sales taxes included in the posted price, such
as U.S. gas taxes, are taken into account at purchase but may not inform
voters about the extent of their tax burden. Earlier studies may have
considered all hidden taxes together, confounding their results. 195
Moreover, the possibility that taxes are hidden from consumers but not
voters implies that, whatever the welfare effects of taxes that are hidden
politically, a tax that was hidden from consumers but not voters could be
purely welfare-increasing.

188. Oates, supra note 8, at 72-78.
189. Dollery & Worthington, supra note 12, at 293-94.
190. Id. at 270,277.
191. Id. at 287-89.
192. Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 36.
193. Martin & Gabay, supra note 8, at 4-5.
194. Id. at 5; see also Finkelstein, supra note 9, at 5 (making same point).
195. Martin & Gabay, supra note 8, at 6-7. However, a major problem with Martin & Gabay's
own findings on the connection between government size and visibility, id. at 13, is that they appear
not to control for the regressivity of the tax. It seems a fair bet that highly regressive taxes would be
highly unpopular with the general public, as suggested by their own anecdote about British efforts to
impose a poll tax, id. at 3.
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In short, there is presently no conclusive evidence to suggest that
hidden taxes in fact increase the size of government. However, that is not
to say that this possibility has been disproven, either.

C. Distributional Questions
A second major welfare question involves the likely distribution of the
burden of hidden taxation. Increasing the difficulty of identifying the
burden of a tax may shift its incidence, if different taxpayers differ in their
willingness or ability to identify the tax. For instance, if the likelihood that
a consumer will pay sales taxes rather than shift to a consumption decision
that is not taxed correlates with lower income, then imposing hidden sales
tax will result in a more regressive tax structure. This is similar to the
possibility that cross-subsidization between purchasers of bundled
consumer goods has distributive consequences. 196 In addition to the
obvious fairness implications these shifts in incidence raise, in the
presence of the declining marginal utility of money they may also have
welfare effects. In other words, if hidden taxes shift the tax burden to the
wealthy, that shift may increase welfare, or vice-versa.
Again, though, there are gaping holes in our current information about
the incidence of hidden taxes. First, we do not know for certain whether
the behavior effects of hiding taxes are largely intentional or unintentional.
Neither do we know, if taxpayers are acting mostly unintentionally, how
taxpayers might adapt to their own shortcomings. Both questions are
important to the distributive inquiry. Indeed, the distributional results
would seem completely different depending on the answers.
1. Distribution in a Rational Loafing Model

Consider on one hand the distributive implications of the theory that
taxpayers rationally decide not to incur the cognitive costs of computing
their likely tax. Once more, the central premise of that claim is that the
taxpayer expects to come out ahead in terms of her well-being, on the
assumption that the disutility of having to compute her tax is larger than
the subjective present discounted value of the tax. 197 This equation implies
two possible reasons that hidden taxes might actually bear more heavily on
higher-income or wealthier taxpayers, respectively.

196. Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 38.
197. See supra text accompanying notes I 02-10.
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For one, higher-income taxpayers by definition have higher
opportunity costs. Time, after all, is money. 198 In the abstract all of the
time a higher-income taxpayer devotes to non-income-producing activity,
such as pondering her tax, is time she doesn't spend earning money. Since
her time is worth more, she is more reluctant to spend it thinking about her
taxes, so she pays more in hidden tax. Except in the case of major life
decisions, though, this probably is a minor consideration; most tax
computations would take such a tiny amount of time that the value of that
time is largely irrelevant.
Second, the fact that taxes make less of an impact on the budgets of
wealthier taxpayers should affect their decision whether or not to compute
the tax. Assume for the moment that the disutility of engaging in the
computation is either identical for all taxpayers or, as I sketched in the last
paragraph, larger for those with higher incomes. We will engage in a
calculation where the expected value of doing the numbers-the tax
savings-is larger than the disutility of the calculation. When we translate
the tax savings from dollars into utility, the diminishing marginal value of
additional dollars will tend to shrink the welfare benefits of loafing for the
wealthy. More plainly, to a millionaire, ten dollars in sales tax is not worth
the effort of thinking hard, but if that ten dollars is the difference between
buying our meds or not, we will think long and hard.
Cutting somewhat against this second point is the possibility of
differential time discounting. Recall that there is a time-discounting factor
that we have to apply to the tax savings on the right-hand side of our
equation. While we have to do our computation now, we get to enjoy the
money we save later. If we depart somewhat from the purely rational
model to note, as empirics suggest, that low-income taxpayers may have
irrationally high discount rates, then this time-discounting may have
distributive effects. 199 Higher-wealth individuals would have a lower
discount rate, value their future tax savings more, and therefore engage in
less loafing. 200 As the time between the computation and the tax savings

198. See Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 40 (noting that opportunity cost of time is higher for
"wealthier" consumers).
199. On the greater patience of the wealthy, see Gary S. Becker and Casey 8. Mulligan, The
Endogenous Determination of Time Preference, 112 Q.J. ECON. 729, 750-51 (1997).
200. To illustrate, imagine two taxpayers, Apple and Orange. Apple has a high discount rate; the
value to her at time Tl ofa future T2 savings of$10 is $8. Orange has a lower discount rate; the value
to her at Tl of a future T2 savings of $10 is $9. Both would experience a disutility of $1.50 from
engaging in a calculation that would enable them to avoid tax and an additional disutility of $7 from
switching to the less-preferred, non-taxed product. Orange engages in the calculation, buys the secondbest widget, and gets a discounted present value of $9 in tax. She comes out $.50 ahead. If Apple did
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increases, these effects grow in significance, although for the most part
they likely will only undercut, rather than exceed, the general effects of the
diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
Another regressive influence is the likelihood that the disutility of
engaging in calculations diminishes as wealth increases. More precisely, it
seems likely that the difficulty of carrying out mathematical operations
declines with education, and education correlates with wealth. 201 Wealthier
individuals may also have computational aids, such as an accountant on
speed-dial, that are unavailable to those of more modest means. 202
As with all my speculations here, it is hard to put numbers on any of
these factors. However, it is plausible that, in the case where taxpayers
rationally loaf on cognitive effort, hidden taxes can be more progressive,
and hence increase overall welfare. Even if time-discounting and ease of
computing reduce the costs of thinking about tax for the wealthy, it will
remain the case that the utility value of cognitive effort will be very large
for the very poor, and tiny for the very rich.
2. Distribution in an Unintentional Ignorance Model
We have a rather different set of factors to weigh in a world in which
taxpayers neglect the effects of hidden taxes because at the time of the
transaction they are incapable of noticing them, and not because they
choose to ignore them. Here the differences between richer and poorer
taxpayers are likely to arise, if at all, because of differences in learning and
de-biasing.
Most obviously, wealthier taxpayers are more likely to be able to pay
for help in overcoming their cognitive limitations. There is at least
anecdotal evidence that accountants, financial planners, and even

the same, she would lose by $.50, since her tax savings would be only $8, and the costs of computing
and switching is $8.50. So Apple pays tax and Orange does not.
Of course, the reader who has labored through this example may well wonder at the assumption
that the cost of computing the cost of computing is itself costless. The literature so far has no
particularly satisfying resolution to this iterativeness problem. Xavier Gabaix et al., Costly Information
Acquisition: Experimental Analysis ofa Boundedly Rational Model, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1043, 1043,
I 055 (2006). One might hope that taxpayers will have a good gut sense of when they can loaf in a way
that improves their utility; possibly they would only loaf where the calculations were obviously very
hard relative to the tax savings. Cf id. at 1055 ("[A] crude myopic solution ... may be reasonable.");
Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, supra note 12, at 5 (suggesting that decisionmakers can avoid a deliberation
cost spiral by simply proceeding on their "best guess").
201. See Marianne Bertrand et al., Behavioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision
Making Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 8, 13 (2006). On the connection between
computational power and education, see Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 150, at 529.
202. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at 789.
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consumer services such as Consumer Reports have helped individuals to
make better decisions about the ideal set of consumer purchases,
notwithstanding efforts on the part of sellers to confuse them. 203 Few of
these services are free. On the other hand, it probably is not worthwhile or
practical to obtain counseling for small transactions, so that if hidden taxes
are used only in that context there may be little distributional effect. 204
Still, education seems likely to improve taxpayers capacity to observe and
compute taxes, and, again, education is strongly correlated with wealth. 205
On the other hand, de-biasing depends on feedback. 206 Individuals must
first become aware that they are making mental errors before they can
begin to correct them. Arguably, higher-wealth individuals might be better
positioned to obtain feedback on the effects of their decisions by virtue of
repetition-they simply engage in more transactions that might be
subjected to tax, and so have more opportunities for learning.
However, a given transaction might provide minimal information about
tax for wealthier taxpayers because the individual is too far from her
budget constraint. 207 That is, it may be that what really triggers recognition
of the impact of a hidden tax for us is the sudden realization that there isn't
enough money in the checking account to pay the next bill-that
something, we know not what, has depleted our resources faster than we
thought. Lower-wealth individuals are much closer to hitting the budget
wall, this theory goes, and hence are more sensitive to hidden tax effects.
This may simply be another way of saying that, because the marginal
value of each taxed dollar is higher for those who have fewer of them, the
feedback effect of suffering a hidden tax is larger. 208
This hypothesis assumes, though, that there is no external source of debiasing, such as political entrepreneurs, that might educate taxpayers about
their misperceptions. Political de-biasing, if it occurs, can have a
distributive valence. 209 Even if the incidence of hidden taxes is distributed
evenly or progressively across the population, de-biasing efforts by
politicians might be skewed towards wealthier constituencies. These
groups might be smaller and more cohesive, which would tend to make

203. See Epstein, supra note 109, at 813; Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 9.
204. Bar-Gill, supra note 109, at 758.
205. Cf Epstein, supra note 109, at 812 n.48 (observing that financial advice is more useful to the
better educated).
206. See supra note 140.
207. Cf Della Vigna, supra note 13, at 50 (noting that individuals can misinterpret feedback when
its results are hard to distinguish from overlapping signals).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 198-99.
209. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 189-90.
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them more politically powerful, and in any event obviously would be able
to afford to pay larger political rents. 210
Thus, it is likely under the unintentional model that hidden taxes are
regressive. That obviously complicates the story in which hidden taxes are
a remedy for the fairness/welfare dilemma. Again, though, we do not
know for what portion of the population the unintentional model is an
accurate description of taxpayer cognition. Under the rational model,
hidden taxes could actually be progressive, aiding the redistributive
project.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Right now hidden taxes offer mostly caveats and unknowns. In this
Part, I will try to suggest why these unknowns loom as potentially critical
questions of public policy. To be sure, right now this is speculative fiction.
But my goal here is start arguments, not necessarily to finish them.

A. Fairness vs. Welfare
If hidden taxes do have the potential to reduce deadweight losses from
taxation, they would transform the landscape of economic thinking about
redistribution and tax progressivity. Existing optimal tax theory, as I noted
at the outset, suggests that redistribution should be sharply limited in order
to avoid changing the behavior of high-eamers. 211 If hidden taxes can
mitigate the behavioral response of those at the top of the bracket, tax rates
can be made much more steeply progressive without concomitant welfare
losses. Whether or not this is feasible on a large scale, again, turns largely
on how taxpayers will respond to substantial taxes; under a rational
ignorance model, gains from hidden taxes will likely be modest. 212
Even under the unintentional model, the potential for welfare gains is
complicated by several tradeoffs uncovered by my analysis here. Where
taxpayers do not rationally ignore taxes, hidden taxes are likely to be
regressive, because richer individuals will be better educated and can
better afford unbiased tax advice. 213 Depending on the extent of this
regressivity and the rate at which the marginal utility of wealth decreases,
this transfer from poor to rich may outweigh the efficiency or fairness

210. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 518-19 (1998).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 18-3 7.
212. See supra text accompanying notes I 02-10.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 202-11.
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gains of hiding an otherwise progressive tax. Thus a hidden progressive
tax may need to direct additional government spending to the poor in order
to achieve the preferred level of redistribution.
Another complication of the irrational model is that increasing taxpayer
self-awareness about the fact that there are hidden taxes both increases and
decreases welfare. Higher self-awareness increases welfare because it
reduces the second-order loss to the consumer from paying too much for
the taxed good. 214 If Tran Taxpayer knows that some of his budget is lost
to hidden taxes, he can plan his purchases to make sure he buys his
essentials before the checking account balance gets close to zero. Thus, it
is more likely that the welfare gains from producer surplus and tax on each
additional transaction Tran and his compatriots enter will outweigh the
consumer losses, making hidden taxes more efficient. At the same time,
self-awareness helps taxpayers to de-bias, which makes the taxes less
hidden over time, ultimately diminishing their effectiveness. 215 Possibly
this conflict could be minimized by imposing hidden taxes primarily on
behaviors that are rarely repeated, such as home sales, or on taxpayers who
have little time to put their lessons to use-students216 or the elderly. 217
But that would greatly limit the universe of useful applications.
While the ultimate verdict for the fairness/efficiency tradeoff is not all
rosey under the unintentional model, it also is not completely hopeless
under the intentional model. This project flies in with a bit of tailwind,
since under the rational model hidden taxes probably are inherently
progressive. 218 As a result it might be possible to impose a large number of
small taxes, each of which would then be mildly progressive. Targeting
the tax to activities that correlate with wealth-an array of small luxury
taxes, for example-would help a bit more.
B. National vs. Local Redistribution

Hidden taxes may also transform one of the central tenets of fiscal
federalism, namely the idea that redistribution can only be carried out

214. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 140---63.
216. That is, the hidden tax would fall on students only while they were students. For example,
there might be phase-outs or other complex wrinkles in tax benefits for higher education that would
make a student's ultimate tax burden higher than it appears.
217. See Bar-Gill, supra note 55, at 8 n.16 ("Generally, infrequent mistakes or mistakes that
generate infrequent feedback are less susceptible to correction by learning."); DellaVigna, supra note
13, at 50-51; cf Epstein, supra note 109, at 811, 814 (noting that feedback is more effective for
standard, repeated transactions).
218. Seesupratextaccompanyingnotes 102-10.
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efficiently by central governments. 219 Mobile taxpayers with little taste for
income equality will relocate in response to efforts to impose
redistributive tax, leading to a race to the bottom among jurisdictions
competing for those taxpayers. 220 Hidden taxes may slow this race by
concealing the effects of tax not only in the origin jurisdiction, so that
potential migrants are less inclined to think of their current home as a bad
deal. In addition, in a world where taxes are hidden, the costs of acquiring
enough information to move to the right jurisdiction are higher, so that
"locational rents" are higher. 221 Each jurisdiction, in other words, can
charge a higher tax rate before it is worthwhile for individuals to flee.
Of course, taxes can also be hidden in the rival jurisdictions. Rivals,
too, might look more enticing if the person choosing between them does
not notice all their taxes. But that is my point, as well as the point of some
of the existing "Leviathan" literature: jurisdictions might compete more
vigorously to hide their tax than to reduce it. 222 The Leviathan scholars
argue, though, that this dampened competition reduces welfare because it
permits rent-seeking politicians to impose a tax level higher than the
population would prefer. 223 I return to that argument later in this Part, but
for now I will note that it also is possible that even under rent-seeking
hidden taxes are second-best efficient. When tax competition between two

219. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 5 at 455; Brown & Oates, supra note 2, at 328;
William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal Role in State Taxation: A Normative Approach, 40
NAT'L TAX J. 611,615 (2007); Stark, supra note 2, at 1408-10.
220. Fox & Swain, supra note 219, at 614-15. If mobility is correlated with wealth, local taxation
may also tend to be regressive. Id. at 615.
221. Cf Galle, supra note 152, at 823 (arguing that cognitive biases increase costs of choosing
correct jurisdiction). These costs are iterative. That is, a rational migrant will not incur the costs of a
first move if she is aware that, after arriving at her destination, the second jurisdiction may respond by
increasing taxes. Since the second jurisdiction's opportunity to raise taxes is limited mostly by the
migrant's cost of exit, as exit costs rise, the risk of higher taxes in the second jurisdiction rises as well.
That will, in turn, make the first move less attractive.
Locational rents are the total value a taxpayer realizes by living in her current jurisdiction rather
than the next best choice. Bhajan Grewal, Locational Surplus and its Relevance for Subnational
Taxation and Inter-governmental Grants in a Federation 166, 167-69, in TAXATION AND FISCAL
FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RUSSELL MATTHEWS (1988). To the extent that rents measure the
amount of tax the jurisdiction could extract, see id. at 173, they can also include the value of not
having to move to another jurisdiction. See Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial
Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 601-02(1983).
222. See MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF FREE MARKETS: THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL
ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 282 (2006); see also
Fox & Swain, supra note 219, at 623 (arguing, albeit not in "Leviathan" context, that jurisdictions
have incentives to mutually export taxes to conceal tax levels from their citizens). As I explained
earlier, it will likely be difficult for one state to compete with another by pointing out the rival's
hidden taxes, rather than simply hiding its own.
223. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in
Federations, 5 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 177, 177 (2003).
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states is fierce enough, both will be obliged to impose rates much lower
than either would prefer. If hidden taxes allow officials to put higher rates
in place, these higher rates could still be lower than the noncompetitive
preference of either. 224
It might be argued that this story is largely irrelevant for entities.
Businesses, the claim would go, typically have tax advice, and so will not
be subject to hidden taxes. 225 That is somewhat true under the irrational
model. There are data, though, suggesting that executives even in large
firms are plagued by cognitive biases in their managerial decisions. 226
Slack in the market for corporate control may allow these inefficiencies to
persist even in a competitive environment. 227 Further, under the rational
model, hidden taxes could still be hidden when the value of computing
them is outweighed by the disutility of the computation. Presumably, the
corporation will hire someone to give it tax advice. Its reserve price for
that service will be whatever its managers are willing to pay to avoid
having to do the computation themselves. Or, put another way, trash
hauling is a lucrative business, and some trash may be too small to be
worth paying someone to take it away.

C. Redistributive Instruments: Tax vs. Substantive Law
Another aspect of redistributive theory impacted by hidden taxes is the
question whether legal rules directly regulating conduct should be
designed with redistributive goals, or whether instead redistribution should
take place solely within the tax system. Kaplow and Shavell and Weisbach
argue for the latter, asserting that the welfare losses from drafting
inefficient but redistributive conduct rules are larger than the welfare

224. Cf Galle, supra note 71, at 899-900 (noting the indeterminacy of offsetting incentives for
officials either to meet local preferences or exploit voter's fiscal illusions in accepting federal grants).
225. See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs
law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2123 (2008); DellaVigna, supra note 13, at 42.
226. Mathew L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for large
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 103-27 (1997) (finding that CEO
hubris has a significant effect on the price paid for corporate acquisitions); Ulrike Malmendier &
Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. FIN.
ECON. 20, 42 (2008) (finding that "overconfident CEOs are unambiguously more likely to make
lower-quality acquisitions when their firm has abundant internal resources").
227. Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance,
CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 721 (2005); see Donald C.
Langevoort, Organized 1/lusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 149-51 (l 997)(arguing that, even
if market mechanism is effective, it may lag many years behind management errors).
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losses from redistributive taxation. 228 Sanchirico posits the opposite,
pointing out that deadweight loss triangles increase in area in proportion to
the square of the absolute size of the distortion, so that to minimize
welfare losses from redistribution we should enact many small
redistributions, rather than one large one. 229 McCaffery and Baron have
weighed in by noting that, to the extent that voters are irrationally averse
to tax, it may be more efficient to redistribute using substantive legal
rules. 230
Hidden taxes may undermine McCaffery and Baron's recommendation.
If taxes are easier to hide than redistributive substantive rules, or if the
behavioral effects of hiding taxes are more pronounced than in other legal
areas, then the tax system should be a more appealing site for
redistribution. The reverse is also possible. This analysis implies, in turn, a
need for future empirical work on the salience and incidence of the
redistributive aspects ofredistributive legal rules. 231

D. Prices: Tax-Inclusive or Tax-Exclusive?
On a more pragmatic note, this project sheds some light on current
controversies over the design of sales taxes and the VAT here and in

228. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, THE EFFICIENCY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM VERSUS THE
INCOME TAX IN REDISTRIBUTING INCOME 1-15 (1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the
Legal System ls Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667,
669 (1994); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 439, 446-53 (2003); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-10,
111-13 (4th ed. 2003); Lior Jacob Strahilovitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 150911 (2007).
229. Sanchirico, supra note 187, at 1006-11; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and
Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 508-10 (1980); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of
Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 331 (2006); Richard S. Markovits, Why
Kap/ow and Shavell's "Double Distortion Argument" Articles are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV.
511, 550-55 (2005); Brett McDonnell, The Economists' New Arguments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 86, 111
(2003) (pointing out that it may be easier to enact redistribution through judicial rules than through tax
legislation).
230. Edward J. Mccaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1748-90 (2005). For evidence suggestive of tax antipathy, see id. at 1759-61;
Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 104, at 40. I take no position here on whether a person's desire to
avoid paying tax is best characterized as an "irrational" aversion to tax, such that a government planner
should not take that desire into account in measuring social welfare, or whether instead it is simply a
"preference" not to pay taxes. On preferences for the way in which goods are delivered, see Douglas
A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of
Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 580-624 (2004).
231. Christine Jolls has made a similar point about the redistributive potential of low-salience
substantive rules. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
V AND. L. REv. 1653, 1669-73 (1998). For more on "sneaky redistribution," see Coate & Morris, supra
note 152, at 1212, 1227.
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Europe. 232 In the United States, prices (other than prices for gasoline) are
usually stated exclusive of tax; in Europe, the norm is often that posted
prices include VAT. 233 My discussion here implies that the welfaremaximizing rule would be a mix of tax-inclusive and exclusive prices for
different goods. 234 Under either the rational or irrational model, hidden
taxes may either increase or decrease welfare, depending on the relative
elasticities of supply and demand and the progressivity or regressivity of
the tax once hidden. A blanket rule therefore will hide taxes in some cases
where it would increase welfare to reveal them, or vice-versa.
E. Democracy vs. Welfare

Another fertile area for debate occasioned by hidden taxes will be in
government theory. Hidden taxes, after all, amount to government by
deception. A rich literature already explores the basic questions of
transparency and government paternalism: the wisdom and legitimacy of
government decisions made out of public sight but supposedly for the
public good. 235 In many cases this debate is waged on what amount to pure
welfare or other instrumentalist grounds. Opaque government is usually
rejected because it is corrupt or self-serving, or, by frustrating citizen
input, may lack full information about public preferences and policy
alternatives. 236 These are welfarist, or at least instrumentalist, arguments.

232. For a discussion of the debate, see Richard F. Bird, Value-Added Taxes and Excises:
Commentary, in REPORT OF A COMMISSION ON REFORMING THE TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
(forthcoming Oxford University Press 2009). Additionally, there are differing rules in the U.S. and
Europe concerning the advertising of prices for air travel. In Europe, airlines must include all taxes in
their posted base price, while U.S. posted ticket prices need not include tax. Morwitz et al., supra note
47, at 10. After this Article was in production, but before it went to press, Jacob Nussim posted a
thoughtful and detailed analysis of the sales-tax question. Jacon Nussim, Taxes, Prices, and Consumer
Protection (Bar-Ilan Univ. Pub. Law Working Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id= I 397643.
233. Alan Schenk, Choosing the Form of a Federal Value-Added Tax: Implications for State and
Local Retail Sales Taxes, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 291, 308-09 (1993).
234. I assume, in line with the Chetty et al. study, that a tax-exclusive price results in the tax being
hidden.
235. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, 3-374 (1986);
Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1264-73 (2004); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. UNN. L. REV. 173, 196-98 (1997);
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1650-73
(1995); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 237-54 (1998); see also
Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 198-99 (asking "Should we be fooling ourselves into
underestimating the tax burden?"); cf Cass Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53
U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1143-45, 1171 (1986) (noting potential for paternalism where decisions about
what constitutes welfare-increasing regulation are made by elected officials).
236. Rossi, supra note 235, at 184-87, 213; Wagner, supra note 235, at 1640-42; see Jerry L.
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But supposing it were the case that hidden taxes unambiguously were
welfare-increasing, what would political theory then imply about their
sharp conflict with participatory democracy? There obviously is much to
say on this front, but I will suggest here only a few preliminary points.
In all likelihood, our view of the welfare/democracy tradeoff will
depend on whether we have an instrumentalist or deontological view of
democracy. That is, suppose (in the deontological approach) that our view
of democracy is that it is inherently valuable, irrespective of its welfare
effects. Perhaps democracy and deliberation are fundamental expressions
of human identity. 237 Or perhaps participation rights are primary goods so
fundamental to our well-being that we would not, ex ante, willingly trade
off them against any other instrumental gains. 238 These approaches would
probably be fairly hostile to hidden taxation. But as others have observed,
many theories of democracy are rather indeterminate in their prescription
for just how thoroughly democratic government must be. 239 Can elected
officials delegate decisions to others? Some decisions but not others?
Rawls's view, for example, apparently was that participation rights are
satisfied so long as citizens would agree that the overarching structure of
democratic decision-making is fair and representative; decisions made
within that framework then are presumptively also fair. 240
The instrumentalist democracy advocate may be more accepting of
hidden taxes, although her view may depend on the surrounding
government structure. The welfarist worry about hidden taxes (aside from
the possible welfare losses I canvassed earlier) is that they facilitate selfdealing by officials. 241 If citizens do not know they are paying money to

Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search of the Law-Science Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
135, 153 (2003).
237. l COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY: THE EARLY WORKS, THE MIDDLE WORKS, THE
LATER WORKS 248 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1991) (arguing that democratic participation is an ethical
ideal embodying norm of self-actualization); 1 id. at 218 (describing democratic participation as part
of the "truly human way of living"); I JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 273-337 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987)
(1981); see also HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 115 (1963); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND
BLUE: A CRlTICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1556 (1988).
238. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 ( 1996).
239. Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 785-806 (1997); Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2091-98 (2005).
240. RAWLS, supra note 238, at 332-38; see Frank I. Michelman, Ida's Way: Constructing the
Respect-Worthy Governmental System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 355-57 (2003); T.M. Scanlon,
Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1479-82 (2004).
241. On the other hand, hidden taxes probably reduce lobbying effort. Cf Dusek, supra note 140,
at 8 (claiming that lobbying effort increases with perceived tax burden).
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the government, it is much easier for officials to use that money for their
own purposes. 242 Note, though, that the problem is not with the tax system
itself, but instead with the use of the tax proceeds. Thus, assuming we
could remedy self-dealing on the spending side, hidden taxes might still be
preferable to others. So a regime of hidden taxation should be
accompanied by a set of strict rules for disclosure of government
spending, penalties for corruption, judicial rules interpreting statutes
against any apparent official self-dealing, and the like.
The possibility of arranging other government rules to maximize the
usefulness of hidden taxes leads me to one final point, that another avenue
for future research opened by the analysis here lies in the area of
institutional design. It is possible that some of the negative features of
hidden taxes can be overcome with careful design of each tax instrument.
For instance, while hidden taxes may make it difficult for citizens to
consume their most-preferred level of public goods, this problem might be
overcome by disclosing the exact amount and incidence of a jurisdiction's
tax alternatives to voters without identifying the precise source of the
funds. To make hidden taxes more transparent and participatory, the
administrators of hidden taxes could include representative citizen panels
or other forms of participatory, rather than electoral, oversight. 243 These
forms of "transparency engineering" have their own complications and
tradeoffs, including the potential for corruption and self-dealing. 244 But if
the welfare gains from hidden taxes are large enough, some experiment
with non-traditional governance forms is likely worthwhile.
F. Fixing What is Broken

Even if further study ultimately concludes that hidden taxes overall
reduce welfare, a close attention to their operation is important, because
our current revenue system already results in many taxes that are largely or
partially hidden. 245 Tax-exclusive sales taxes and tolls, as we now know,

242. This point is similar to the argument that a reason to treat similar taxpayers similarly is that it
makes it more difficult for politicians to favor their preferred interest group. See BRENNAN &
BUCHANAN, supra note 17, at 45,227.
243. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 316--38 (1998); Jody Freeman, The Private Rafe in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547, 551-56 (2000); see id. at 664-71 (proposing that a participatory model
replace electoral accountability with other forms of responsiveness to public input).
244. ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL
192-200 (2007); Rossi, supra note 235, at 213-17, 244-45.
245. Krishna & Slernrod, supra note 48, at 199.
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both change taxpayer behavior. 246 Many commentators believe that
income tax withholding makes the income tax less visible, although there
are no data to support that intuition as yet. 247
Suppose, then, that we wish to avoid hidden taxes. For example,
suppose it turns out that hidden taxes increase the regressivity of the tax
system, and that is an undesirable result. That finding would justify efforts
either to make taxes more transparent or, if reengineering is
impracticable,248 to adjust tax rates to offset the distributive effects of the
tax system's design. Perhaps the fact that we know some present taxes are
hidden offers a stronger justification for greater transparency in
government spending, along the lines I suggested in the last subpart. More
dramatically, if hidden taxes are irremediably anti-democratic, and
withholding hides taxes, we must decide whether our aversion to opacity
is worth giving up the very substantial administrative and fraud-reducing
benefits of withholding. 249
CONCLUSION

It remains theoretically uncertain whether hidden taxes can increase
welfare. Taxes with low salience can diminish deadweight losses from
taxation. At the same time, shrouding taxes from consumers may result in
inefficient allocation of scarce dollars, including inefficient choices about
where to live and which public officials to entrust with public funds. If
hidden taxes prove to be regressive, that would further diminish overall
welfare. Furthermore, taxpayers may, but probably will not, anticipate that
there will be hidden taxes. And while some individuals can learn to
recognize a hidden tax, others will struggle to obtain feedback or forget
the lessons of the past.
While there remains a need for further empirical work, my analysis
here has identified several key questions upon which that work should
focus. The foremost of these is whether or how often the diminished
behavioral response to a hidden tax is a deliberate choice on the part of
most taxpayers. As I have explained, that question's answer in tum will

246. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
247. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 48, at 194; Lawrence Zelenak, The Myth of Pretax Income,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2261, 2271 (2003); Dusek, supra note 140, at 12.
248. One prominent example of an instance where it might prove difficult to reengineer the tax
system to increase salience is income tax withholding. Again, withholding has long been said to reduce
taxpayers' awareness of their total tax bill, but it is hard to imagine how one could implement a
modem income tax without withholding. Krishna & Slernrod, supra note 48, at 194.
249. On the benefits of withholding, see id.; Dusek, supra note 140, at 11-12, 24.
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determine whether hidden taxes can be "scaled up" to raise large portions
of a government's revenues, as well as impacting the distributive effects of
a given hidden tax. I expect to report the results of my own investigation
of that question in future work.
As a result, the largest policy debates that could be triggered by hidden
taxes remain just over the horizon. But, considering the difficulty and
importance of some of those questions, it seems a good idea to get a head
start on how they should best be resolved.

